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Abstract 
The idea for a Law of the Atmosphere was introduced to the world in 1988 as an institutional 
approach to atmospheric problems as a whole, and for a brief period there was a high level of 
interest in the idea. But a Law of the Atmosphere was never established. In this thesis, I seek 
to answer the question: Why did a Law of the Atmosphere fail to become a regime during its 
1988 to 1992 window of opportunity? I created a method designed to answer this question 
based on a comprehensive table of factors influencing establishment of international 
environmental institutions that were derived from the literatures on regime formation, 
commons governance, and international environmental cooperation. Using document 
analysis and interviews, I determined which factors from this table inhibited the Law of the 
Atmosphere from becoming a regime. High influence factors were available solutions, 
leadership and issue characteristics. Moderate influence factors were policy area, resource-
user characteristics, knowledge, and context. 
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Chapter 1; Introduction 
Introduction 
The atmosphere is a global commons whose integrity is threatened. The 
concentrations of many of the trace gases and aerosols that comprise the Earth's atmosphere 
are currently changing at an unprecedented rate, a phenomenon that threatens "far-reaching 
and major impacts" (WMO 1988, 292). The changes in these concentrations are due to both 
natural and human-induced causes. Over time, human-induced causes have increased. 
Human activities now release a wide range and large volume of pollutants into the 
atmosphere. The resulting consequences include altered atmospheric chemistry, damaged 
ecosystems, and endangered human health. Addressing these and other problems related to 
the atmosphere requires an approach that takes into account the unified character of the 
global atmosphere. The seemingly limitless links and interactions taking place between 
various components of the atmosphere speak to the interconnected and interrelated character 
of the Earth's atmosphere. 
Despite the interconnected character of the global atmosphere, the current approach 
of the international community to governing the atmospheric commons remains ad hoc and 
piecemeal. At the international level, a kaleidoscope of agreements addresses multiple issues 
on multiple scales from bilateral to global with little consideration for the relationships 
among them. There are problem-specific, legal regimes on issues such as climate change, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, tropospheric ozone formation, and acid rain. Each is narrowly 
focused; none treat the atmosphere as an integrated whole. 
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Toward a Law of the Atmosphere: 1988-1992 
The idea of uniting the array of international atmospheric agreements under a single 
umbrella convention first emerged in 1987 at the First North American Conference on 
Preparing for Climate Change. Howard Ferguson, then Assistant Deputy Minister of 
Canada's Atmospheric Environment Service (AES), had come up with the idea for a "Law of 
the Atmosphere" in 1986, and shared his idea in an address to the conference (Climate 
Institute 1987). His idea was promoted to a wider audience at a World Conference on the 
Changing Atmosphere held in Toronto in 1988. The Toronto Conference was attended by 
over 300 scientists and policymakers from 46 countries and organizations. The conference 
statement reads, "Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive 
experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to global nuclear war" 
(WMO 1988, 292). The conference statement called for the development of an Action Plan 
for the Protection of the Atmosphere that "includes an international framework convention, 
encourages other standard-setting agreements and national legislation ... complemented by 
implementation of national action plans that address the problems posed by atmospheric 
change at their roots" (WMO 1988, 296). The conference statement also recommended the 
creation of a World Atmosphere Fund to finance the implementation of the Action Plan. 
In 1989, a follow-up conference was held in Ottawa. Eighty legal and policy experts 
from around the world, representing government, non-government, and academic 
institutions, attended this Meeting of Experts. Its purpose was to develop the legal and 
institutional framework for a Law of the Atmosphere, as well as a 'lesser' convention on 
climate change. The development of both conventions simultaneously was a central 
recommendation of the Ottawa Meeting (Department of External Affairs 1989, 1). The 
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Meeting of Experts produced a set of draft principles that could form the basis of a Law of 
the Atmosphere, along with a second set of overlapping principles for a convention on 
climate change. The Law of the Atmosphere was drafted as a framework convention that 
addressed all threats to the global atmosphere; it designated the atmosphere "a common 
resource of vital interest to mankind" (Department of External Affairs 1989, 2). The meeting 
participants anticipated that the climate change convention, along with other existing 
atmosphere-related regimes, would be integrated into the Law of the Atmosphere once both 
were sufficiently developed. 
The Toronto Conference and Ottawa Meeting were intended as preparatory 
conferences leading up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), or Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The principles and components 
of a Law of the Atmosphere were to be ready for consideration at UNCED. While the 
proposal was discussed in various international meetings prior to 1992, it gained no further 
ground. Little attention has been paid to the idea of a Law of the Atmosphere since 1992. On 
the other hand, the 'lesser' UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
one of the crowning achievements of UNCED. The original plan to incorporate the climate 
change convention and other atmosphere-related international agreements into an 
overarching Law of the Atmosphere never came to pass. Why? The research question I seek 
to answer is: What factors explain why a Law of the Atmosphere failed to become a regime 
during its 1988 to 1992 window of opportunity? Or, to use a recently coined terminology: 
Why did the Law of the Atmosphere remain a "nonregime"? 
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The Law of the Atmosphere nonregime 
In a recent paper, Dimitrov et al. (2007) argue for the establishment of a research 
agenda on nonregimes. They define a nonregime as "a transnational policy issue area 
characterized by the absence of multilateral institutions for ordering actors' interactions" 
(Dimitrov et al. 2007, 234). The authors maintain that nonregime theory is necessary to 
evaluate the findings of regime theory, and that causal arguments presented by regime 
theorists cannot be properly evaluated without the study of nonregimes. Regime theory has 
constituted a major research program within the discipline of international relations since the 
mid-1970s, focusing almost exclusively on the origin, function, and effectiveness of 
international regimes (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997; Little 2008; Young 1999). 
Extensive research on successful cases of regime formation exists; however, as Dimitrov et 
al. argue, case studies of non-formation are nearly absent from the literature. The limited 
amount of work on nonregimes does not offer a systematic approach to nonregime theory and 
is only able to offer preliminary findings on factors hampering regime creation. The paucity 
of nonregime case studies strengthens the criticism that current regime literature lacks control 
groups. Regime theorist Arild Underdal (2002, 447) claims, "There is a real possibility that 
the entire field of regime analysis is biased in favour of positive findings." In this study, I 
classify the Law of the Atmosphere as a nonregime. While multilateral institutions exist for 
separate elements of the global atmosphere, there is no single multilateral institution 
responsible for governing actors' interactions relative to the atmosphere as a whole. 
There is a caveat to how the term "Law of the Atmosphere" is used in this thesis. 
While it can be defined to incorporate environmental (e.g., air pollution control) and non-
environmental (e.g., air traffic regulation) elements, I focus solely on the environmental 
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elements because there already exists a de facto Law of the Atmosphere for air traffic, the 
most significant non-environmental element. Global harmonization of air traffic is essential 
for safety and economic efficiency reasons. In addition, there exists a single international 
aviation authority, the International civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). No such 
harmonization or international organization exists for environmental issues. 
Pursuing the Law of the Atmosphere as a nonregime study 
Defining a Law of the Atmosphere as a nonregime provides a venue for employing 
the analysis set forth by Dimitrov et al. However, although they define nonregime and issue a 
challenge to develop a research agenda on nonregimes, they do not set forth a method for 
explaining nonregimes. They offer only a few brief suggestions for pursuing nonregime 
study, including a vague reference to 'inverting' theories of regime formation (Dimitrov et al. 
2007, 253), but carry their development of a method no further. Therefore, the first step of 
my research was to create a substantive method to apply to my nonregime case study. In the 
next chapter (Chapter 2), I develop this method by extracting from three literatures relevant 
to the establishment of international environmental governing schemes factors that affect the 
likelihood of creating such schemes. I examined each of the regime, commons, and economic 
cooperation literatures, and extracted factors related to successful regime formation, 
commons governance, and international environmental cooperation. These were then 
synthesized to produce a single summary table of factors. This set could then be applied to 
my Law of the Atmosphere case study to determine the presence or absence of each factor 
and to analyse its relative influence on the nonregime outcome. 
The second step of my research was to construct a table of key actors and a timeline 
of events that helped shape the fate of the Law of the Atmosphere (Chapter 3). The timeline 
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is divided into four sections. The first section runs from the signing of the 1979 Geneva 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) to the signing of the 
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The second section covers 
1985 to 1988, from the genesis of the idea for a Law of the Atmosphere to the first calls for a 
Law of the Atmosphere in smaller meetings. The third section spans the period of strongest 
support for a Law of the Atmosphere, beginning with the 1988 World Conference on the 
Changing Atmosphere and ending with the 1989 Ottawa Meeting of Legal and Policy 
Experts. The final section picks up after the Ottawa Meeting and ends in 1992 with UNCED. 
The third step of my research was to identify the factors from the summary table that 
inhibited the Law of the Atmosphere from becoming a regime (Chapter 4). They were 
identified using document analysis and interviews, and constitute the answer to my research 
question. 
The concluding Chapter 5 discusses the implication of my findings for nonregime 
research and for policymaking on the atmosphere as a whole. Nonregime theory identifies a 
significant gap in international relations theory. While enormous scholarly effort has gone 
into creating theories of regime formation, significantly less effort has gone into explaining 
why regimes fail to form. My research contributes to the new area of nonregime study by 
offering a methodology for the analysis of nonregimes and applying it to a case study of the 
Law of the Atmosphere. My research will also assist international policymakers. It sheds 
light on the complexities and challenges faced in governing the atmosphere and offers 
guidance on future efforts at formulating global policy for governing the global atmosphere. 
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Chapter 2: Methods 
Introduction 
There are two types of literature that are most relevant to the research topic of this 
thesis: the literature on the Law of the Atmosphere (relevant to the topic area of the thesis) 
and the literature on nonregimes (relevant to the methodology of the thesis). Literature on the 
Law of the Atmosphere is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. To my knowledge, this 
thesis is the first research specifically devoted to this topic. There are only a handful of works 
that address the Law of the Atmosphere concept. These are cited in the later chapters (in 
particular, Chapter 3 and 4). The literature on nonregimes isn't much larger. This literature 
and the method used to analyse the Law of the Atmosphere as a nonregime case study is 
explained in this chapter. 
As Dimitrov et al. (2007, 231) confirm, research on nonregimes is virtually absent 
from regime literature. The limited amount of study tends to be narrow in focus. For 
example, Dimitrov's (2002) studied the coral reef nonregime and Bessette and Haufleur's 
(2001) the information nonregime, but neither develops a methodology applicable to general 
nonregime study. Similarly, Dimitrov et al's (2007) proposal for a nonregime research 
agenda is not accompanied by a methodology. The first step of my research project, 
therefore, was to create a substantive methodology that could be applied to my nonregime 
case study. 
A few theoretical and methodological considerations are offered by Dimitrov et al. 
for the pursuit of nonregime study. For example, "A systematic pursuit of [nonregime 
research] will likely involve contributions from diverse intellectual orientations" (Dimitrov et 
al. 2007, 252). While it may seem intuitive to simply analyse for the absence of factors that 
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regime theory deems conducive to regime formation, Dimitrov et al. advise that such a 
'reversal' of regime formation analysis may not be sufficient for nonregime analysis. They 
note that factors influencing nonregime formation do not necessarily parallel factors leading 
to regime formation: "Researchers must be prepared to find variables that have typically been 
neglected or omitted" (Dimitrov et al. 2007, 254). 
In order to achieve a more complete method for analyzing nonregimes, I incorporated 
two literatures, in addition to the regime formation literature, to increase the likelihood of 
detecting factors beyond those involved in a simple reversal of regime formation. There are 
numerous literatures that could potentially contribute to a more robust method. I selected 
those on commons theory and economic theory of international environmental cooperation. 
These literatures were chosen because, like regime theory, they deal with cooperation among 
sovereign actors in the absence of a central enforcement authority. Cross-disciplinary 
research between regime theory and commons theory (Keohane and Ostrom 1995), and 
regime theory and the economic theory of international environmental cooperation 
(Neumayer 2001), highlights the learning opportunities for regime theory offered in these 
literatures. I drew from these three diverse but related literatures on environmental 
governance in order to create my methodology for nonregime analysis. 
In the next section, each literature area is introduced and a table of factors presented 
that has been identified from the given literature as conducive to successful construction of 
regimes, or governing of commons, or establishment of cooperation. I conducted a non-
exhaustive search of each literature area to derive the factors listed in Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 
1.3. Factors were initially gleaned from articles presenting summaries of a given literature 
area (e.g., for regime theory (Young and Osherenko 1993), for commons theory (Dietz, 
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Ostrom, and Stern 2003), and for economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation (Neumayer 2001)). Eminent authors who had identified relevant factors were 
noted and their original work tracked down. The three tables therefore represent a 
comprehensive yet preliminary codification of factors from each literature area, and are not 
intended to be taken as complete. Each factor listed is accompanied by a brief explanation. 
Since the number of authors cited for each factor is not large, and in some cases is a single 
author, in these explanations I used the voice of the authors whose factors I selected (i.e., I 
paraphrased from the original works cited in the "sources" columns of the tables). In this 
way, I am acknowledging the need for a more exhaustive search of the literature for all works 
that address a given factor. I must leave this exhaustive search as an area for "further 
research." 
The three sets of factors (37 altogether) were then synthesized into nine summary 
factors. To arrive at this set of nine summary factors, I followed three general guidelines. 
First, categorization of factors was already present in much of the summary work on a 
literature area. For example, Young and Osherenko (1993) synthesize factors influencing 
regime formation into four categories: power, interest, knowledge, and context. In deciding 
the final nine summary factors, I utilized such categorization schemes already present in each 
literature area. Second, I took into account which factors a literature emphasized over others 
and which factors were less certain. Factors that were identified in the literature as extremely 
influential in regime formation (e.g., leadership) were candidates to be a summary factor, 
while those less influential or less certain factors were considered sub-factors. Third, there 
was some clear overlap in factors between the three literatures. Factors such as scientific 
knowledge and number of players were central in all three literatures. 
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The summary factors were created to reflect commonalities among the factors in each 
of the literature areas and simplify my nonregime method. They are presented in a summary 
table in the final section of this chapter. 
Three literatures, three sets of factors 
Regime theory 
The first literature is the body of work within regime theory on regime formation. 
Regime theory emerged in the mid-1970s as a major focus within the discipline of 
international relations. Regime theorists explore the origin, function, and effectiveness of 
regimes (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997; Little 2008; Young 1999). Regime theory 
has been viewed as a reconciliation of idealist and realist conceptions of interstate relations; 
that is, it assumes that norms influence state behaviour, but that such "norm-governed 
behaviour [is] wholly consistent with the pursuit of national interests" (Haggard and 
Simmons 1987, 492). The regime formation literature focuses on explanations for successful 
regime formation. Since factors identified in the regime formation literature that are missing 
relative to a given nonregime may help explain the existence of the nonregime, they are 
included in my method. Dimitrov et al. (2007, 253) point out that a simple inversion of 
theories of regime formation may explain nonregimes. Table 1.1 displays 21 factors derived 
from the regime formation literature, together with an explanation of the factor and citations 
to key sources, that scholars have identified as important to successful regime formation. 
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Table 1.1 Regime theory: Factors contributing to regime formation 
Factor 
Hegemon 
Balance of power 
Integration 
Normative-
institutional 
Explanation 
The international system is more stable when a there is a 
concentration of power resources in a single state (a 
hegemon). If a hegemon exists in a specific issue area a 
regime is more likely to form. If there is no hegemon, and 
power is dispersed, then regime formation is less likely 
since transaction costs rise. The hegemon dominates and 
leads in the issue and is supported by its superior share of 
power. There are two ways a hegemon may lead. A benign 
hegemon induces cooperation by taking a disproportionate 
share of costs for a higher payoff after a regime has 
formed. A coercive hegemon uses its power to form a 
regime and force others to comply. 
A balance of power is maintained among states by 
constant counterbalancing of changes in international 
power. A balance of power among participating states 
encourages stability of their relations. Regime formation is 
more likely when states participating in the regime 
formation process have a roughly symmetrical distribution 
of power. 
Integration among states usually begins in limited 
functional and economic areas. Integration generally 
increases over time and is difficult to reverse. If relevant 
states are well integrated and process a high density and 
wide spectrum of transactions, then regime formation is 
more likely. 
A regime is more likely to form when an issue belongs to 
a policy area already structured by international 
institutions. Existing international organization influences 
regime formation by providing a forum for further 
development and setting a precedent for cooperation. 
Existing institutions also serve as models or focal points 
for creating a new regime. 
Source(s) 
(Krasnerl976; 
Keohane 1980) 
(Waltz 1979; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Mitrany 1975; 
Efinger, Mayer, 
and Schwarzer 
1993) 
(Rittberger and 
Ziirn 1990; 
Efinger, Mayer, 
and Schwarzer 
1993) 
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Issue properties 
Integrative 
bargaining and 
veil of 
uncertainty 
Equity 
Salient solutions 
Exogenous 
shocks or crises 
In dissensual conflicts, actors disagree on what is 
desirable for them individually and collectively. A 
dissensual conflict about values is the most difficult to 
regulate because values cannot be negotiated, while a 
dissensual conflict about means to achieve an agreed upon 
end is more likely to lead to regime formation. In 
consensual conflicts, actors all desire the same object, but 
no one can be fully satisfied. A consensual conflict about 
relatively assessed goods is difficult to regulate because it 
often sparks intense competition, while a consensual 
conflict about absolutely assessed goods is more likely to 
lead to regime formation. 
Integrative bargaining aims to combine negotiators' 
interests to produce a higher payoff for all parties. 
Integrative bargaining requires a negotiating climate 
favourable to contractarianism. Contractarianism holds 
that norms derive their force from mutual agreement. The 
veil of uncertainty is an important element of integrative 
bargaining and refers to a party's uncertainty about its 
position over time. A thick veil of uncertainty helps ease 
regime negotiations. 
Articulation of institutional options that all parties accept 
as equitable contributes to regime formation. Parties will 
make some sacrifice in efficiency in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. A solution that features equal sacrifice 
for all parties is more likely to be accepted. 
The existence and appeal of simple or familiar solutions 
helps regime negotiations to succeed. Salient solutions 
offer uncomplicated formulas that are intuitively 
appealing or borrow familiar formulas from prior cases. 
They can also be easily explained to policymakers and the 
general public. 
The occurrence of shocks or crises separate from the 
regime negotiating process increases the likelihood that 
the regime will form. Exogenous shocks and crises may 
help promote agreement on the terms of a contract. Crises 
may be manufactured by non-governmental organizations 
or the media. The media may also enhance the effects of 
exogenous shocks or crises on regime formation. 
(Rittberger and 
Ziirn 1991) 
(Young 1989; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Young 1989; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Schelling 1980; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Young 1989; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
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Policy priority 
Common good 
Science and 
technology 
Relevant parties 
Compliance 
mechanisms 
Scientific 
convergence 
There are two contrary lines of research on the influence 
that an issue's priority on the policy agenda has on regime 
formation. First, priority on the policy agenda can 
contribute to success in regime formation, and second, a 
regime is more likely to form when it is not high priority 
on the agenda of parties. 
The common good refers to the considerations of morals 
and ethics in governing common property. The choice by 
a state to set aside national interests in favour of the 
common good helps regime formation succeed. Success is 
also encouraged by states widening their interests to 
include the common good. 
The tendency of negotiating parties to focus on scientific 
issues increases the likelihood of regime formation. A 
regime is also more likely to form if parties with scientific 
backgrounds have a larger role in negotiations. An issue 
that is more technical as opposed to political is also more 
conducive to regime formation. 
Every stakeholder must participate or be represented in 
regime negotiations to help achieve success and a lasting 
agreement. If all stakeholders are not present in critical 
stages of negotiations, then an excluded party may refuse 
to accept or even sabotage negotiations and/or the 
agreement. 
The availability of clear-cut and effective compliance 
mechanisms help to ease institutional bargaining and 
promote regime formation. Compliance mechanisms aid 
in overcoming the common concern that other players will 
fail to comply with the terms of the regime. Compliance 
mechanisms vary substantially from decentralized to 
centralized systems of implementation to increased 
transparency for easier detection of violations. 
A common and widely understood conception of the 
causes of a problem and suitable responses clears the way 
to regime formation. Scientific consensus on the cause-
and-effect relationship of an environmental issue 
encourages international cooperation. Some theorists 
argue that international cooperation occurs almost 
spontaneously with scientific convergence on an issue. 
(Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Soroos 1988; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Adler and Haas 
1992) 
(Axelrod 1985; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Cooper et al. 
1989; Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
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Epistemic 
communities 
Contextual 
factors 
Individuals as 
leaders 
Cognitive factors 
An epistemic community is a network of professionals 
with recognized expertise in a particular domain that 
frames and articulates a problem and its solutions. Regime 
formation is encouraged when an epistemic community 
arises in an issue area. The epistemic community 
communicates with policymakers to convey their 
understanding of the issue and can often influence the 
form of regime options. An epistemic community offers 
consistent, authoritative and informed advice to reduce 
uncertainty in the issue area. 
Opportunities provided by events and conditions unrelated 
to the issue under consideration may influence the 
likelihood of regime formation both positively and 
negatively. Large national and international events may 
influence regime formation even when they do not fall 
into the same policy area. Contextual factors can affect the 
timing and content of a regime in the process of 
formation. 
The presence of strong and consistent individual 
leadership leads to regime formation. Individuals who 
exercise leadership aim to overcome collective-action 
problems by promoting regime formation to involved 
parties. There are different forms of individual leadership 
that can be exercised (even simultaneously) in regime 
negotiations, but only the emergence of some form of 
individual leadership is necessary to increase the 
likelihood of regime formation. 
Cognitive theory explores the limits of human rationality 
and brings certain judgemental heuristics and biases into 
focus. Cognitive factors have been identified that 
influence regime formation. The development of trust is a 
cognitive factor that allows the cooperative aspects of a 
given bargaining situation to prevail over the conflicting 
aspects of the situation, thus making regime formation 
more likely. Another cognitive factor that makes regime 
formation more likely is convergence around a formula; 
that is, a shared perception or definition of a problem. 
(Haas 1992; 
Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Young and 
Osherenko 1993) 
(Young 1991) 
(Jonsson 1992) 
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Domestic sources 
Favourable 
intellectual 
climate 
Analysis of domestic sources of regime formation brings 
regime analysis down to the actor level and considers the 
role of societal forces. A trading state has a competitive 
economy, a high dependence on foreign trade and does not 
have abundant traditional power resources. If more trading 
states act in an issue area, regime formation is more likely. 
A domestic structure that is 'corporatist' has a relatively 
high share of public revenues, a medium degree of state 
strength and stronger degree of centralization in 
organization of societal interests, and a strong social 
democratic electorate. If more states in an issue area have 
a corporatist domestic structure, regime formation is more 
likely. Regime formation is also encouraged as more 
reformist changes take place (short of revolution) in the 
governing coalitions in the issue area. Lastly, regime 
formation is more likely if the number of domestic groups 
in the issue area likely to benefit from policy change is 
greater than the number of domestic groups that benefit 
from the status quo. 
Intellectual traditions are the set of ideas, values, and 
images that prevail in a given society. Intellectual 
traditions shape the formation of regimes, and a 
favourable intellectual climate helps a regime to form. If 
obstructionist intellectual traditions decline, then regime 
formation is more likely. Intellectual traditions decline 
when competing intellectual traditions rise, when 
intellectual traditions lose their institutional homes (at 
state, transnational and societal levels), and through 
empirical invalidation. 
(Ziirn 1994) 
(Corrales and 
Feinberg 1999) 
Commons theory 
The second literature I drew on for my methodology is commons governance, which 
analyses the design of strategies and institutions to sustainably govern collectively owned, or 
common-pool, resources. Common-pool resources are characterized by low excludability and 
high subtractability; that is, excluding consumers of a resource is difficult, and consumption 
of the resource subtracts from the total amount available for others (Ostrom 2008). The 
origin of the commons literature can be traced to Garrett Hardin's (1968) classic article, "The 
tragedy of the commons." Hardin explored what are now referred to as "open-access 
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resources," a subcategory of common-pool resources. Even though Hardin's pessimistic 
conclusion of the inevitable destruction of the commons (i.e. open-access resources) has been 
disputed and revised by many successive commons theorists, it has provoked prodigious 
research effort. I draw upon the commons literature because the object of my study, the 
atmosphere, is a common-pool resource. In addition, the literature on commons governance 
emphasizes the characteristics of the resource itself, along with the characteristics of those 
drawing on the resource. 
Research on common-pool resources has identified features of a commons that make 
governance easier and more likely to succeed, and requirements and principles for effective 
governance, including design principles for governing institutions. As a whole, commons 
theory tends to focus on local and regional arrangements rather than on global arrangements. 
As a result, factors that lead to the emergence of a global commons governance scheme (i.e. 
global regimes) have not been fully explored by commons theorists. However, the plethora of 
studies by commons theorists on the emergence of institutions for governing natural 
resources is relevant to this study in that some of the characteristics of local and regional 
common-pool resource management can logically be applied to global resources like the 
atmosphere (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Keohane and Ostrom 1995). Table 1.2 displays nine 
factors derived from the commons literature, together with an explanation of the factor and 
citations to key sources, that scholars have identified as important to successful commons 
governance. 
16 
Table 1.2 Commons theory: Factors contributing to commons governance 
Factor 
Social capital 
History of user 
organization 
Resource 
characteristics 
Explanation 
Social capital is based on material and symbolic relations 
of exchange, and can be institutionalized. Social capital 
can be used to mobilize a social network, and the greater 
the amount of social capital the greater the ability to 
mobilize. Social capital is highest when social bonds are 
strong, communication between resource users is frequent, 
and social networks are dense. Social networks function as 
platforms for the exchange of ideas and mutual 
encouragement for participation. Resource-users that 
interact and trust one another are more likely to cooperate 
to govern a commons. 
Resource users with a history of interaction and prior 
experience with at least minimal levels of organization are 
more likely to cooperate to govern a commons. Prior 
experience can be through the presence of a general 
purpose organizational structure (e.g. a village council), or 
a specialized organizational structure related to the 
resource, but without prior management responsibilities 
(e.g. an airplane club). Experience with organization can 
also be fulfilled by the presence of nearby organizations 
that have helped others govern similar commons issues. 
Successful commons governance is easier when the 
resource is small, uniform, simple and predictable. A 
smaller size usually means fewer users and makes the 
resource easier to monitor. Other resource characteristics 
that aid in commons governance are a relatively small 
number of negative externalities from resource use and the 
ability to discern stable and well-delineated boundaries 
around the resource. If a resource is part of a complex 
system, it is more difficult for resource-users to agree on 
rules to address the numerous externalities. Clear 
boundaries make identification of resource-users and the 
extent of their use easier to determine. Resources that are 
time dependent are less likely to be governed than those 
that are not. That is, a renewable resource with a 
replacement rate that grossly exceeds the withdrawal rate, 
or a resource with a withdrawal rate that grossly exceeds 
the replacement rate to the current point of near-
destruction is less likely to be governed. 
Source(s) 
(Ostrom 1998; 
Pretty 2003; 
Dietz, Ostrom, 
and Stern 2003) 
(Ostrom 1990; 
Taylor and 
Singleton 1993; 
Ostrom 1992) 
(Ostrom 1990, 
2001; Dietz, 
Ostrom, and 
Stern 2003; 
Schlager, 
Blomquist, and 
Tang 1994; 
Dolsak and 
Ostrom 2003) 
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Resource-user 
characteristics 
Knowledge and 
information 
Support for 
monitoring and 
enforcement 
Strong leadership 
Resource-users are most likely to create common-property 
institutions when the number of users is small enough to 
keep communication and decision-making costs low and 
when appropriators reside permanently near or in the 
resource. At the local level, a lower degree of 
homogeneity among resource-users makes users more 
likely to organize to govern a commons. At the global 
level, heterogeneity in capabilities, preferences, and 
information and beliefs usually facilitates cooperation but 
occasionally may not, depending on the context. 
Resource-users that share a long-term vision for the 
resource and its benefits are better able to successfully 
govern a commons. A moderate to heavy level of resource 
use also encourages resource-user cooperation, as they 
attempt to prevent overuse. 
Successful commons governance is easier when the 
dynamics of the resource are well-understood, including 
the stocks, flows, and processes within the resource 
system and the human-environment interactions that affect 
the resource system. Information should be verifiable, and 
it must be congruent with decision-makers' needs and the 
scale of the particular decision or event. Information must 
include scientific uncertainties and individual and societal 
values related to the resource. 
Commons governance is helped by users that support 
monitoring and enforcement to provide strong incentive to 
obey rules. Effective commons governance requires that 
rules be followed, and it is generally most effective to 
impose modest sanctions on first time offenders and 
gradually increase sanctions for repeat offenders. 
Enforcement mechanisms may be formal or informal, but 
must be imposed by a source viewed by resource-users as 
legitimate. Financial instruments that encourage rule 
compliance are often more effective than 'command and 
control' systems, where compliance is regulated and rule-
breakers are punished. 
Strong leaders help establish and encourage collective 
action to govern a commons. Leaders, or mobilizers, issue 
empowerment messages that emphasize the value of 
collective action and the importance of individual efforts 
coordinated with others. Empowerment messages raise 
expectations of the contribution that others will make, and 
can help jump start collective action to govern and protect 
a commons. 
(Keohane and 
Ostrom 1995; 
Ostrom 1992; 
Adams et al. 
2003) 
(Ostrom 1990; 
Dietz, Ostrom, 
and Stern 2003; 
Dolsak and 
Ostrom 2003) 
(Trawick2001; 
Dietz, Ostrom, 
and Stern 2003) 
(Blomquist 1992; 
Vasi and Macy 
2003) 
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Costs vs. benefits 
Authority 
Cooperation to govern a commons is more likely when the 
cost of collaboration is less than the cost of individual 
action. If a resource is perceived to be valuable and worth 
the cost of management, then resource-users are more 
likely to create an organization for its protection. The 
perceived benefits of organization must also be higher 
than the perceived costs of organization. The perception 
that there are high benefits of organization are most likely 
to arise when resource-users have full and accurate 
information about resource dynamics, the benefits and 
costs of various actions and outcomes, and the history and 
reliability of other resource-users. 
Resource-users must have the authority to govern a 
commons in order to successfully establish rules for its 
protection. Resource-users may establish a set of rules to 
govern a commons, but external authorities must give 
them at least minimal recognition of the rights to organize. 
If resource-users have the authority to organize to govern 
a commons, they are protected against outside interference 
or overturning of their rules by external authorities. 
(Taylor and 
Singleton 1993; 
Kadekodo 2004) 
(Ostroml990) 
Economic theory of international environmental cooperation 
The third literature I include in my nonregime methodology is drawn from the 
discipline of economics. Literature from the economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation utilizes economic reasoning to understand and predict international cooperation 
under anarchic conditions. 
Kenneth A. Oye's (1985, 2) seminal book Cooperation under anarchy laid the 
groundwork for the economic theory of international environmental cooperation, based in the 
"austere abstractions of game theory and microeconomics." The economic theory of 
international environmental cooperation analyses and provides insight into the likelihood and 
strength of cooperation, and strategies for altering both of these variables. Dimitrov et al. 
(2007, 252) recommend game theoretic analysis because rejected moves and outcomes may 
be explanations for the existence of a nonregime. This literature was included in my 
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nonregime methodology because it constructs "a tractable model that results in testable 
propositions" (Neumayer 2001, 124), and because the "elegance and explanatory power" of 
its models contrasts with the more open and versatile approaches taken in regime and 
commons theory (Neumayer 2001, 141). Table 1.3 displays seven factors derived from the 
international environmental cooperation literature, together with an explanation of the factor 
and citations to key sources, that scholars have identified as important to successful 
environmental cooperation. 
Table 1.3 Economic theory: Factors contributing to international cooperation 
Factor 
Payoff structure 
Free-rider 
deterrence 
Explanation 
Game-theoretic analysis deals with strategic behaviour, 
where a player's success is dependent on the actions of 
other players. It assumes that there is a unitary actor 
supplied with a clear payoff matrix. With numerical 
values, the payoff matrix specifies the benefits of mutual 
cooperation, mutual defection, unilateral defection, and 
unrequited cooperation. Each player weighs their choices 
relative to the potential choices of others and makes a 
rational decision based on all available information. 
International cooperation is likely to occur when its payoff 
is perceived by players as the best and most rational 
choice. 
International cooperation to create a regime is more likely 
to be successful when the terms of the agreement are able 
to deter free-riders. Free-riders benefit from the terms of 
the agreement while incurring no costs of their own. Free-
riding may be internal and carried out by signatories to the 
agreement through non-compliance with its terms. Free-
riders may also be external to the agreement. To achieve 
free-rider deterrence, an agreement must be self-
enforcing; that is, recourse to an external authority for 
enforcement is not possible since parties cannot be forced 
to sign and comply with an agreement. Some self-
enforcing agreements employ mechanisms such as 
economic sanctions and credible threats. Deterrence 
mechanisms must outweigh the benefits of free-riding by 
causing proportionately more damage. 
Source(s) 
(Oye 1985; 
Barrett 1990, 
1997) 
(Barrett 1990) 
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Renegotiation-
proof 
Model 
uncertainty 
Issue linkage 
Number of 
players 
A regime that is renegotiation-proof has higher prospects 
for formation. A renegotiation-proof agreement requires a 
state (or states) make a credible threat on a free-riding 
state that is not compliant with the terms of the regime. To 
make the threat credible, a state must not end up worse off 
after executing the punishment on the free-riding state 
than it would be without carrying it out. The state must be 
better off executing the punishment than renegotiating the 
terms of the regime with the free-rider. Agreements must 
be renegotiation-proof or free riders will escape without 
punishment and expect a new agreement in its place. 
Model uncertainty occurs when players do not understand 
a problem in its full complexity and have incomplete 
information about their payoff relative to others. Model 
uncertainty can detract from regime formation because 
states can use it to disguise their true reasons for 
opposition to regulation (usually based on national 
interests). Model uncertainty provides a safe haven from 
which states can oppose regime formation on the grounds 
of'not proven.' 
Linking negotiations of disparate issues expands the zone 
of possible agreement. Issue linkage strengthens 
incentives for cooperation by linking together different 
issues, with each issue having a different payoff matrix for 
each player involved. Issue linkage is most able to 
promote cooperation when the states involved have 
markedly asymmetric preferences. Issue linkage works 
best when one set of players value cooperation in one 
issue and not in another, while another set of players value 
the opposite. Linking issues is more profitable than 
separate negotiations and can deter free-riding while 
making agreements more stable. 
A small number of players are more likely to cooperate to 
form a regime because they are able to sustain full 
cooperation in a self-enforcing agreement. An agreement 
among a large number of players can only improve 
marginally on the outcome of non-cooperation. Large-
scale cooperation is difficult to achieve and usually does 
not produce significant results. An agreement involving a 
large number of players is either narrow instead of wide or 
shallow instead of deep. Issue linkage makes large-scale 
cooperation more likely. 
(Finus and 
Rundshagen 
1998) 
(Helm 1998) 
(Cesar and 
Zeeuw 1996; 
Barrett 1997; 
Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1997) 
(Barrett 1999) 
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Side payments 
and transfers 
Side payments and transfers are designed as strategic 
incentives to promote cooperation. They involve a 
payment or transfer from one or more parties in an 
agreement to other parties to induce cooperation and 
inclusion in the agreement. The prospect of side payments 
or transfers may reduce a player's incentive to sign an 
agreement, since the player will benefit from payments 
and transfers from outside of the agreement. But side 
payments also make cooperation possible when players 
have heterogeneous views on an issue or costs are 
unequal. 
(Kaitala and 
Pohjola 1995; 
Hoel and 
Schneider 1997; 
Botteon and 
Carraro 1997; 
Compte and 
Jehiel 1997; Wirl, 
Huber, and 
Walker 1998) 
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Summary of factors contributing to regime formation 
The list of almost 40 factors in Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 provides a comprehensive, 
though undoubtedly incomplete, set of elements that potentially can contribute to regime 
formation, where "regime formation," as I am using the term, it is equated to not only 
successful regime formation but also successful commons governance and successful 
environmental cooperation. These factors were compared and commonalities identified. 
Based on the identified commonalities, a set of nine summary or 'super-factors' were created 
(Table 2). These summary factors transform the long list into a clearer and more manageable 
set that I used for analysis of the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime in the following 
chapters. 
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Table 2. Summary factors contributing to regime formation 
Summary 
Factor 
Power 
Knowledge 
Leadership 
Interest and 
payoff 
Issue 
characteristi 
cs 
Resource-
user 
characteristi 
cs 
Available 
solutions 
Policy area 
Context 
Explanation 
Certain configurations of power 
among actors can encourage 
regime formation. 
The state of scientific knowledge 
in the issue area and the level of 
cooperation of the scientific 
community influence regime 
formation. 
The presence of a strong and 
consistent individual or state 
leader who champions an issue 
influences regime formation. 
Each actor weighs its best 
interests and payoff relative to 
other actors. If regime formation 
is in an actor's interest and offers 
an acceptable payoff, then a 
regime is more likely to form. 
The nature of the issue in 
question and the ease of 
governance influences regime 
formation. 
The characteristics of users that 
draw on a resource influence the 
likelihood of regime formation. 
The solutions, especially 
institutional options, available to 
address an issue affect regime 
formation. 
The issue under consideration 
can be categorized into a larger 
set of issues. This policy area 
and its governing institutions 
influence regime formation. 
Issues and events separate from 
the issue under consideration 
affect regime formation. 
Factors 
. .^ • Balance of power 
• Authority ^ 
• Science and 
technology • Favourable 
• Scientific intellectual climate 
convergence • Knowledge and 
• Epistemic information 
communities • Cognitive factors 
• Model uncertainty 
• Individuals as
 0 i , , . . 
. , • Strong leadership 
• Costs vs. benefits • Free rider deterrence 
• Payoff structure • Side payments and 
• Issue linkage transfers 
• Common good • Integrative 
• Relevant parties bargaining and veil 
• Compliance of uncertainty 
mechanisms • Renegotiation-proof 
T ±. • Resource 
• Issue properties , ,. . „. 
characteristics 
• Support for 
• Domestic sources monitoring and 
• Social capital enforcement 
• History of user • Resource-user 
organization characteristics 
• Number of players 
• Equity • Salient solutions 
• Integration 
• Normative- • Policy priority 
institutional 
, , • Contextual factors 
shocks or crises 
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Putting the factors to work 
The table of nine summary factors is the foundation for my methodology for 
nonregime analysis. In chapter four, the presence or absence of each factor is determined and 
its relative influence on the nonregime outcome analysed. Factors are categorized as having a 
high, moderate, or low level of influence. The presence or absence of a factor and its relative 
influence were established through interviews and document analysis. Five people were 
interviewed (Appendix 1). I used participant lists of meetings related to the Law of the 
Atmosphere to identify those who may have been involved in the Law of the Atmosphere 
debate. Given the time that has elapsed since these meetings it proved to be very difficult to 
track people down. Many times I ended up discovering that a person I was seeking had 
passed away. Once I was able to contact someone, I asked if there was anyone else who it 
would be worthwhile to get in touch with. Despite enormous effort to find participants active 
in the Law of the Atmosphere debate, in the end, I was able to locate and interview only five 
people. The interviews were semi-structured, and all were recorded and conducted by 
telephone. See Appendix 1 for a list of interview questions. Material from these interviews 
and from a small set of primary and secondary documents are explained over the course of 
the next two chapters. The factors identified from this process and their influence constitute 
the answer to my research question. 
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Chapter 3: Birth and death of the Law of the Atmosphere: A timeline 
Introduction 
In this chapter, a timeline relevant to the quest for a Law of the Atmosphere is 
presented. Key players and events are highlighted. The timeline provides the context for my 
analysis in the next chapter. The timeline is divided into four periods. The first period begins 
in 1979 with the creation of the LRTAP Convention to address the acid rain problem and 
ends with the creation of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 
1985 to address the stratospheric ozone depletion problem.1 The second period runs from 
1985 to 1988, beginning with the genesis of the idea for a Law of the Atmosphere to its first 
calls in smaller forums. Canada and the United States (US) emerged as the key state-level 
players in the life of the Law of the Atmosphere idea. The third period spans the time during 
which the idea for a Law of the Atmosphere enjoyed its strongest support, from the 1988 
Toronto Conference to the 1989 Ottawa Meeting. The call for a Law of the Atmosphere was 
first made on the world stage at the Toronto Conference. Three atmospheric issues propelled 
this conference: acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, and climate change. Each was the 
topic of a theme paper summarized in the conference statement, and each was addressed by 
the three keynote speakers: Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Norwegian Prime 
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, and Canadian Minister of the Environment Tom McMillan 
(WMO 1988). The fourth and final period runs from the end of Ottawa Meeting to the 
UNCED in 1992. Each of the four periods is discussed in a separate section. 
1
 Even though the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty was the first international treaty created for global atmospheric 
governance, it is not included in this timeline because it had little or no influence on the Law of the Atmosphere 
process. Little reference was made to it at the Toronto Conference, and participants did not expect that it would 
be included in a Law of the Atmosphere. 
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Period 1: 1979-1985, LRTAP Convention to Vienna Convention 
1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
The first regional treaty designed to govern and protect against a threat to the 
atmosphere, the LRTAP Convention, was signed in 1979. The roots of the convention extend 
back to the late 1960s when Swedish soil scientist Svante Oden first published a study 
tracing the acidification of Scandinavian lakes to sulphur emissions from Britain and 
Continental Europe (Oden 1967, 1968), thus identifying the large-scale atmospheric problem 
that came to be called "acid rain." Throughout the 1970s, scientific studies continued to 
support the hypothesis of long-range, transboundary transport of air pollution, illuminating 
the need for international cooperation to combat acid rain. In response, the LRTAP 
Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE). The convention was signed by 34 governments and the European 
Community. Its aim was "to protect man and his environment against air pollution and ... 
endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution 
including long-range transboundary air pollution" (UNECE 1979). It was a "framework 
convention," meaning that the convention was intended to provide a framework for 
addressing the problem but that specific measures would be enacted through protocols. 
During the time period under consideration in this thesis, protocols were signed in 
1985 (Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary 
Fluxes By At Least 30%), in 1988 (Sofia Protocol concerning the Control of Nitrogen Oxides 
or their Transboundary Fluxes), and in 1991 (Geneva Protocol concerning the Control of 
Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes). The ongoing 
issue of acid rain addressed in the LRTAP Convention was a major influence on the 
27 
perceived need for a Law of the Atmosphere, and the convention's framework-protocol 
structure served as a model for international response to atmospheric problems. 
1982 Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (or, Law of the Sea, for short) was the 
product of the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that began in 1973 
and concluded in 1982. The Law of the Sea is a comprehensive regime for all uses and 
resources of the world's oceans and seas, and has a history that extends back to 1958 when 
UNCLOS I was held. UNCLOS I adopted four conventions: Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. 
UNCLOS II took place in 1960 to resolve remaining contentious issues, but no new 
agreements resulted. The conference was reconvened in 1973 (UNCLOS III), and 
negotiations continued for the next nine years. UNCLOS III was a "global diplomatic effort 
to regulate and write rules for all ocean areas, all uses of the seas and all of its resources" 
(Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea 2009). Factors that drove the need to develop 
a comprehensive treaty for the world's oceans included the vastly increased intensity of 
ocean uses, an accelerating trend toward conflicting ocean claims, and the inadequacy of 
existing international law to handle these problems (Sebenius 1984, 11). 
More than 160 states participated in UNCLOS III. The resulting convention (the Law 
of the Sea) was signed in 1985. Its most significant features relate to navigational rights, 
territorial sea limits, off-shore economic jurisdiction, legal status of resources on the seabed 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships through narrow straits, 
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conservation and management of living marine resources, protection of the marine 
environment, marine research, and a binding procedure for settlement of disputes between 
states (Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea 2009). The duration, complexity, and 
problems of the Law of the Sea negotiations would later heavily influence reaction to the 
idea for a Law of the Atmosphere. Sebenius (1991, 123) identified four factors that "virtually 
guaranteed" the long duration of the Law of the Sea process, and that could do the same for a 
Law of the Atmosphere: (i) virtually universal participation; (ii) a powerful set of rules and 
understandings aimed at making all decisions by consensus, if at all possible; (iii) a 
comprehensive agenda; and (iv) the agreement to seek a single convention that would 
constitute a "package deal." To further add to negative perceptions of the Law of the Sea, 
three major industrial powers refused to accede to the treaty: Germany, Britain, and the US 
(Sanger 1986). In 1994 and 1997 respectively, Germany and Britain ratified the Law of the 
Sea. To date, the US still has not (Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea 2009). 
The Law of the Sea entered into force on November 16, 1994, twelve months after its 
sixtieth ratification, and 12 years after the conclusion of UNCLOS III. Thus, during the time 
when a Law of the Atmosphere was under active consideration, the Law of the Sea was still 
in limbo. 
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
The roots of the stratospheric ozone depletion issue and its associated Vienna 
Convention trace back to James Lovelock's detection of the presence of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) in remote locations of the Earth's atmosphere in 1971 and to Rowland and Molina's 
Nobel Prize-winning research that shed light on the process by which CFCs destroy ozone 
molecules in 1974 (Ozone Secretariat 2000). Although the Rowland-Molina hypothesis 
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remained disputed until the late 1980s, the serious potential consequences of the diminishing 
stratospheric ozone layer combined with the growing use of CFCs worldwide proved enough 
to spark an international response. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
became a leader and in 1981 convened an ad-hoc working group to design a global 
framework convention. This led to the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer, signed by 28 states, which set out general guidelines for cooperation in 
research, monitoring, and information sharing, and procedures for adoption of protocols and 
amendments (UNEP 1985). Hard targets for CFC reduction were not set in the Vienna 
Convention; these would come later under the Montreal Protocol and its three amendments, 
discussed in the next section (Period 2). Like acid rain, the issue of stratospheric ozone 
depletion helped set the stage for the 1988 Toronto Conference on the changing atmosphere. 
Start of climate change politicization 
Climate change was the third main atmospheric issue addressed at the Toronto 
Conference. At first, climate change was a concern only among scientists; it did not become 
a concern to policymakers until the end of Period 1 in 1985. The First World Climate 
Conference (WCC-1), convened by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), was the 
first major international meeting on climate change. It took place in Geneva in February 1979 
and was attended by scientists from around the world. The conference declaration identified 
increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels, 
deforestation, and changes in land use as the leading cause of climate change, and warned 
that continued expansion of human activities "may cause significant extended regional and 
even global changes of climate" (WMO 1979, 709). Governments were called upon "to 
foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-
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being of humanity" (WMO 1979, 711). Conference participants did not go as far as to 
recommend international political action. 
The first call in an international forum for a policy response to climate change was 
made at the 1985 Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and Other 
Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, held in Villach, Austria 
and sponsored by the WMO, UNEP, and the International Council for Scientific Unions 
(ICSU). The Villach conference statement reads, "it is now believed that in the first half of 
the next century a rise of global mean temperature could occur which is greater than any in 
man's history" (WMO 1986), and issued a recommendation that policymakers work with 
scientists to explore policy options. 
The conference statement also called for the creation of a small task force on 
greenhouse gases with a mandate to (i) help ensure that appropriate agencies and bodies 
follow up its recommendations, (ii) ensure periodic assessments are undertaken of the state of 
scientific understanding and its practical implications, (iii) provide advice on further 
mechanisms and actions required at the national or international levels, (iv) encourage 
research in developing countries to improve energy efficiency and conservation, and (v) 
initiate, if deemed necessary, consideration of a global convention (WMO 1986). This led to 
the creation of the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG), consisting of seven 
eminent scientific experts, at a WMO/UNEP/ICSU-sponsored meeting also in 1985. The 
AGGG's first meeting took place in July 1986. The AGGG would serve a very active and 
influential role as an advisor to governments until its phase-out in 1990 (Boehmer-
Christiansen 1996; Agrawala 1999). Because the AGGG's mandate included considering the 
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need for a global climate change convention, it was an important player in the story of the 
Law of the Atmosphere. 
Summary 
During Period 1 (1979-1985), three large-scale atmospheric issues coalesced to bring 
political attention to the human influence on the atmosphere—acid rain, stratospheric ozone 
depletion, and climate change—and served to heighten the potential need for a Law of the 
Atmosphere. Climate change was the only one without an existing convention. In addition, 
the 1982 Law of the Sea resulting from the almost decade-long UNCLOS III provided a 
model for a comprehensive environmental regime; however, it would not enter into force 
until 1994. 
Period 2: 1985-1988, Genesis of idea for a Law of the Atmosphere 
A first wave of environmentalism characterized by the rise of domestic environmental 
movements ran from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, and a second wave characterized by the 
rise of international and global issues such as acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, climate 
change, loss of biodiversity, threats to rainforests, and emergence of the concept of 
"sustainable development" began in the mid-1980s and extended into the mid-1990s 
(Paehlke 1997). The remainder of the events discussed in this timeline took place during this 
second wave. 
The 1987 report Our Common Future by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, better known as the Brundtland Commission after the name of its chair, Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, introduced the notion of sustainable development and heightened the 
profile of global environmental issues which launched the second wave (Commission on 
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Environment and Development 1987). Because sustainable development tied together 
environmental and poverty issues, it struck a chord with developing nations. This idea was 
both novel and attractive, and garnered such significant support that it was made the 
centrepiece of UNCED. The Brundtland Commission also played an indirect role in the Law 
of the Atmosphere story. 
Canada: Source and leader for a Law of the Atmosphere 
The idea for a Law of the Atmosphere came out of Environment Canada's AES. In 
1986, Tom McMillan, Canada's Minister of the Environment, appeared before the 
Brundtland Commission and offered to host an international conference on an aspect of 
global change. The result was the 1988 Toronto Conference on the changing atmosphere. 
Howard Ferguson, who served as Assistant Deputy Minister of AES from 1986 to 1989, was 
appointed Director of the Toronto Conference. During consultations for the conference, 
Ferguson shared his idea for a Law of the Atmosphere with conference organizers (Smith 
2001). It drew support from both the Minister and the Prime Minister, both of whom would 
go on to promote it in their keynote speeches. 
Canada became the strongest state supporter of the Law of the Atmosphere. Canada's 
leadership on the Law of the Atmosphere overlaps with its leadership on climate change. It 
viewed a Law of the Atmosphere as an umbrella solution for all atmospheric problems, 
including the immediate problem of climate change. The need for international regulation on 
climate change, along with the ongoing development of protocols for acid rain and 
stratospheric ozone depletion, paved the way for the suggestion of a Law of the Atmosphere 
as a broad solution. Canada was able to assume a leadership position because of the technical 
and function expertise in Environment Canada, especially in AES (Smith 2001). Extensive 
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scientific and political work on international atmospheric issues had been carried out by 
members of AES, and its members were at the forefront of international negotiations on the 
acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, and climate change issues (Smith 2001). 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
The Vienna Convention was created in 1985 as a framework treaty intended to be 
strengthened by protocols. Negotiations for a protocol advanced significantly with 
publication of the famous 'ozone hole' paper only two months after the Vienna conference, 
in which researchers with the British Antarctic Survey unveiled remarkable evidence of 
major declines in stratospheric ozone concentration over the Antarctic in the spring (Farman, 
Gardiner, and Shanklin 1985, 210). The discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole produced a 
sense of urgency in protocol negotiations, and quickly led to the Montreal Protocol in 1987. 
The Montreal Protocol was designed to adapt to evolving scientific knowledge. During the 
window of opportunity for a Law of the Atmosphere, the Montreal Protocol would be 
subjected to one adjustment, the 1990 London Amendment. The London Amendment 
strengthened the Protocol by adding more ozone-depleting chemicals to the phase-out 
schedules and establishing a mechanism for financial and technical assistance to developing 
country parties. The achievements and relative ease of protocol negotiations directly 
influenced and inspired supporters of a Law of the Atmosphere. On the other hand, they also 
spoke to the merits of a framework-protocol approach over a comprehensive treaty. 
First calls for a Law of the Atmosphere 
Workshops were held in Villach, Austria and Bellagio, Italy in 1987 (Workshops for 
Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change) to build on the consensus reached 
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at the 1985 Villach conference. The workshops were endorsed by the WMO, UNEP, and the 
ICSU as part of the policy development process for climate change and by the AGGG as a 
step toward fulfilling its mandate to ensure follow-up action on the 1985 Villach 
recommendations. The 1987 Villach Workshop provided a technical basis for exploring 
further policy steps at the later Bellagio Workshop. Priorities for policy action were produced 
at the Bellagio Workshop and included development of a Law of the Atmosphere (Jaeger 
1988). Howard Ferguson, a participant at the Bellagio workshop, was responsible for 
drawing attention to the Law of the Atmosphere and its inclusion in the Bellagio policy 
recommendations (interview with Howard Ferguson, October 27, 2009). 
Meanwhile, the First North American Conference on Preparing for Climate Change 
took place from October 27-29, 1987 during the interval between the 1987 Villach and 
Bellagio workshops. It was sponsored by the Washington, DC-based Climate Institute, which 
made the claim that the gathering represented the first time that climate researchers had met 
with a broad array of policymakers, and that both global warming and stratospheric ozone 
depletion were addressed (Tangley 1988). Howard Ferguson also attended this conference, 
and in his address, he first voiced the need for a "broader Law of the Atmosphere" (Climate 
Institute 1987, 99). He argued that a Law of the Atmosphere would solve what he saw as a 
major ongoing problem with international regulation, the tremendous lag time between the 
planning of any significant environmental action and that action's implementation. A call to 
international policy action on climate change was also made by honorary co-chairmen of the 
climate conference, Senator George Mitchell (Democrat, Maine) and Senator John Chafee 
(Republican, Rhode Island). They announced plans to introduce a resolution in the US 
Congress calling for an international convention on climate change. 
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Emerging American position on a Law of the Atmosphere 
The reaction of the US to a Law of the Atmosphere was particularly important 
because the US was the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. In 1988, the US was 
responsible for approximately one-fourth of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, with per 
capita emissions among the highest in the world (Energy Information Administration 2006). 
The success or demise of efforts to govern the global atmosphere would be heavily 
influenced by US reaction. The US held substantial financial and technological resources that 
could sway both developed and developing nations to follow its lead for or against an issue 
(Harris 2000). 
The election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 marked the end of a decade of 
progressive environmental action and legislation in the US, which included the establishment 
of its Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, creation of a national climate change 
research program in 1978, clean air legislation in 1970 and 1977, and clean water legislation 
in 1972 and 1977. President Reagan saw environmental conservation as "fundamentally at 
odds with economic growth and prosperity," and he sought to terminate or cripple many of 
the environmental policies advanced in the 1970s (Park 2000, 79). However, the increasing 
attention paid to climate change was hard to ignore. In 1987, the Global Climate Protection 
Act was enacted to initiate the development of a coordinated national policy on climate 
change. The Act also called for the development of a US strategy for further international 
cooperation to limit the impacts of climate change (Park 2000). 
In this context, the idea for a Law of the Atmosphere was brought to Law of the Sea 
veteran Edward L. Miles (1998, 21) for consideration in October 1987 by the chair of an 
interagency committee on oceans. Miles advised against a major US initiative on the Law of 
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the Atmosphere. He described his experience as the "chosen hatchet man" for the idea, 
meaning he was responsible for deciding if the initiative should move forward or not, and he 
wrote that his reaction to the idea of a Law of the Atmosphere was "intensely negative" due 
to the decade of his life spent in the Law of the Sea negotiations (Miles 1998, 21). As an 
alternative, Miles (1998, 24) proposed that protection of atmospheric and other common-pool 
resources could be achieved by "pursuing 'soft' regulation in a decentralized fashion as a 
strategy for buying time in the face of uncertainty" and stated that the initial response of the 
Department of State to this idea was enthusiastic. The evolving US stance on international 
climate change policy is further discussed later in the chapter. 
Summary 
During Period 2 (1985-1988), the idea for a Law of the Atmosphere was born in 
Canada. Canada's role as leader for the Law of the Atmosphere began in the planning stages 
of the 1988 Toronto Conference. Prior to the Toronto Conference, Howard Ferguson 
introduced the idea for a Law of the Atmosphere in two smaller forums. The US was exposed 
to the idea early on, and while it did not express immediate opposition, it was quietly 
dismissed. Other nations either did not know of or did not react to the idea. 
Period 3: 1988-1989, Toronto Conference to Ottawa Meeting 
The Law of the Atmosphere enjoyed its strongest support from 1988 to 1989. The 
proposal for a Law of the Atmosphere was first rolled out on the world stage to a large and 
diverse audience at the Toronto Conference in 1988, it was discussed in various international 
meetings in the following year, and a draft text adopted into the statement of the Ottawa 
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Meeting. This is the furthest the Law of the Atmosphere would be developed, and the last 
time it would be seriously considered in an international forum. 
1988 Toronto Conference 
The Toronto Conference was in part held in response the call to action issued by the 
Brundtland Commission to "people of all countries and all walks of life" to reorient future 
development to sustainable paths in order to secure social and ecological stability 
(Commission on Environment and Development 1987). Speaking before the Brundtland 
Commission in 1986, Canada's Minister of the Environment, Tom McMillan, took up the 
call to action and volunteered his country to host an international conference to consider 
ways of improving world capacity for forecasting environmental change. He suggested 
climate change as one of the main topics, and with the encouragement of the Commission, 
Canada began preparations for what came to be called the World Conference on the 
Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, held in Toronto, June 27-30, 1988 
(WMO 1988). The Toronto Conference included representatives from North America (204), 
Western Europe (46), Asia (24), Africa (16), South and Central America (16), Eastern 
Europe (6), Australia/New Zealand (5), and international organizations (24, representing 15 
agencies), for a total of 341 delegates. 
A key message of the conference organizers to participants, as stated in the forward to 
the conference proceedings, was: 
"We were intent on demonstrating our conviction that these major 
atmospheric pollution issues are not independent, but are inextricably linked, 
and that political action to deal with both causes and effects must be based on 
a more holistic approach to atmospheric change and the human and economic 
dimensions of such change." (WMO 1988, vii) 
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This was authored by Law of the Atmosphere architect and Conference Director, Howard 
Ferguson. 
Calls for a Law of the Atmosphere were made in special addresses by Canadian 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Environment Minister Tom McMillan. In Mulroney's 
opening address, he forecast that a Law of the Atmosphere could be ready for the 1992 Earth 
Summit. He called the 1985 Helsinki Protocol on acid rain and the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
on stratospheric ozone depletion "important planks" on which a Law of the Atmosphere 
could be built. He stated that "we need new international legal mechanisms to forge global 
cooperation to protect and restore our atmospheric life-support system" (WMO 1988, 6), and 
announced that Canada would host an international meeting of legal and policy experts the 
following year (1989) to follow-up on the plan for a Law of the Atmosphere, with particular 
focus on climate change. 
In McMillan's closing address to the conference, he declared that "The Government 
of Canada is passionately committed to the concept of an International Law of the Air" 
(WMO 1988, 34). Like Mulroney, he envisioned that a Law of the Atmosphere could be 
ready for the 1992 Earth Summit, and that it would "tie together, and build on" previous 
international agreements on components of the atmosphere (WMO 1988, 34). He concluded 
by stressing that, although Canada was committed to the Law of the Atmosphere concept, his 
country would support any effective global instrument to achieve the common purpose of 
protecting the atmosphere, including a narrower convention on climate change. 
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland in her keynote address did not 
directly refer to a Law of the Atmosphere but did stress the links between climate change, 
acid rain, and stratospheric ozone depletion. She urged "an international action plan for 
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protecting the atmosphere and, in particular, for preventing climate change" (WMO 1988, 
20). Her plan included developing strategies for energy reduction, further research on 
renewable energy, creation of a technology transfer program, an increase in general scientific 
research, and development of a global climate change convention. 
The conference statement reiterated steps already taken to develop international law 
and practices to address atmospheric change—for example, the Trail Smelter arbitration of 
1935 and 1938, Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the UN Conference on the 
Environment, Part XII of the Law of the Sea Convention, the LRTAP Convention, and the 
Vienna Convention and its Montreal Protocol—and urged that the next step should be an 
"overall convention constituting a comprehensive international framework that can address 
the interrelated problems of the global atmosphere" (WMO 1988, 296). A call for action was 
issued to governments, the United Nations, other international bodies and NGOs to work 
urgently towards an "Action Plan for the Protection of the Atmosphere." The Action Plan 
was to include development of a "comprehensive global convention as a framework for 
protocols on the protection of the atmosphere. The convention should emphasize such key 
elements as the free international exchange of information and the support of research and 
monitoring, and should provide a framework for specific protocols for addressing particular 
issues, taking into account existing international law" (WMO 1988, 297). It was 
recommended in the conference statement that development of a convention be vigorously 
pursued at the Ottawa Meeting in 1989, the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference in 1989 
(which produced the Noordwijk Ministerial Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and 
Climatic Change), and a Second World Climate Conference (WCC-II) in 1990, in order to 
prepare it for consideration at the UNCED in 1992. Part of the Action Plan was to ensure that 
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the statement and proceedings of the Toronto Conference were made available to the 
conferences mentioned above, and to all nations of the world. The conference also called for 
establishment of a World Atmosphere Fund to support implementation of the Action Plan. 
The World Atmosphere Fund would be partially financed by a levy on fossil fuel 
consumption in industrialized countries (WMO 1988). 
The Toronto Conference was lauded by its organizers as the first comprehensive 
meeting on the atmosphere between scientists and high-level policy makers. In later years, it 
would be tagged as the starting point of international political efforts to address climate 
change (Paterson 1996). The conference statement included the first call for a reduction in 
global greenhouse gas emissions, and urged a non-binding target of a twenty percent 
reduction from 1988 levels by 2005. 
Less than a year after the Toronto Conference, two of the key individual supporters 
for a Law of the Atmosphere departed from Canadian politics. Howard Ferguson left 
Canada's AES to organize and direct the WCC-II in Geneva, and Tom McMillan was 
defeated in the 1988 general election. The new Minister of the Environment, Lucien 
Bouchard, made no reference to a Law of the Atmosphere. 
IPCC: Preparations for a framework convention 
The politicization of climate change brought the legitimacy of the AGGG as the lead 
advisory panel on climate change into question. With the likelihood of a future climate 
convention mounting, the US wanted an "intergovernmental mechanism" set up to conduct 
scientific assessments of climate change (Agrawala 1997, 5). The "free wheeling experts" 
comprising the AGGG were not viewed as an appropriate mechanism for building 
international consensus, especially on an issue that was beginning to promise "enormous 
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economic repercussions" (Bernstein 2001, 166). The US view was shared by other 
industrialized countries, and heavily influenced the passage of a resolution by the WMO 
Executive Council Meeting requesting that the WMO and UNEP jointly establish "an 
intergovernmental mechanism to carry out internationally coordinated scientific assessment 
of the magnitude, impact and potential timing of climate change" (Agrawala 1999, 165). In 
response, the two organizations created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in 1988 to fulfill "the need of broad and balanced information about climate change" 
(IPCC 2009). Initially, the role as top advisor to governments on climate change shifted back 
and forth between the IPCC and the AGGG; however, by 1990 the work of the AGGG had 
been so marginalized that the group disbanded (Agrawala 1997). 
A resolution by the UN General Assembly titled "Protection of global climate for 
present and future generations of mankind" outlined the first task of the newly created panel. 
It was to provide a comprehensive review of climate change; namely, the state of scientific 
knowledge on climate change, social and economic impacts of climate change, possible 
response strategies, identification of relevant legal instruments with a bearing on climate, and 
elements for inclusion in a possible future international convention on climate (UN General 
Assembly December 6, 1988). The target date for completion of the IPCC's initial 
assessment was set for two months prior to the WCC-II in Geneva. In order to fulfill its 
mandate, the IPCC established three main working groups: Working Group I assessed 
available scientific knowledge on climate change; Working Group II assessed the 
environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change; and Working Group III 
drafted the list of elements for a framework convention on climate change. By October 1989, 
Working Group III had produced an initial draft of possible elements for inclusion in a 
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climate convention, and was expressing "full support for a framework convention" on 
climate change modelled after the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer 
(Zaelke and Cameron 1990, 273). 
The work of the IPCC and its support for a framework convention on climate change 
received high profile endorsements. A 1989 Declaration of the Hague on the Environment 
urged all states and international organizations to take into account studies by the IPCC, in 
order to develop "the framework conventions and other legal instruments necessary to 
establish institutional authority" and to "protect the atmosphere and to counter climate 
change, particularly global warming" (The Hague March 11, 1989). Similarly, the 1989 
Noordwijk Ministerial Declaration on climate change endorsed the work of the IPCC and 
recognized a number of key principles of relevance to a climate treaty (Noordwijk 
Ministerial Conference 1990). The declaration of the 1990 Houston G7 Summit also 
expressed strong support for the work of the IPCC and for negotiation of a framework 
convention on climate change (Houston Economic Summit July 11, 1990). 
In general, these endorsements did not include statements supporting creation of a 
Law of the Atmosphere, or even agreements to encompass all interrelated problems of the 
atmosphere. The exception was the Declaration of the Hague on Environment, which spoke 
to general protection of the atmosphere, while at the same time emphasizing the importance 
of immediate action on climate change. The Noordwijk Ministerial Declaration also hints at a 
more comprehensive response in its recommendation that preparations for a climate 
convention should consider relevant aspects of the Vienna Convention for Protection of the 
Ozone Layer, and "innovative approaches as may be required by the complex character of 
the problem" (Noordwijk Ministerial Conference 1990, 601). While a Law of the 
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Atmosphere was not mentioned explicitly in any of the above statements, it was still a topic 
of discussion at other international meetings during the same time period. 
International debate over a Law of the Atmosphere 
In September 1988, the Woods Hole Research Center hosted an international 
workshop to consider effective political and economic steps for responding to climate 
change. The workshop was attended by 50 specialists in science and international policy and 
law. Participants discussed the potential of both national and international actions for 
mitigating climate change. The idea of a Law of the Atmosphere was debated, and it was 
concluded that, while desirable in the long run, it was overly ambitious, unlikely to succeed 
in the short term, and might hinder the development of a climate change convention. Instead, 
energies should be directed toward the creation of a climate convention (Ramakrishna and 
Woodwell 1989). Workshop participants did, however, support the call at the Toronto 
Conference for the establishment of a World Atmosphere Fund to help less-developed states 
reduce emissions and to support atmospheric research. 
The First US-Canada Symposium on Impacts of Climate Change on the Great Lakes 
Basin was also held in September 1988. It was attended by 120 people with public and 
private interests in the Great Lakes Basin and climate change. Participants aimed to define (i) 
the dimensions of the potential impacts of future climate change on the Great Lakes, and (ii) 
the joint research needs for the two nations (US National Climate Program and Canadian 
Climate Centre 1989, 2). In his address to the symposium, Howard Ferguson once again 
suggested a Law of the Atmosphere. He emphasized that early action toward a Law of the 
Atmosphere was necessary, as one to two decades was the usual gap between scientific 
concern and international policy action, and suggested an extension of "our concerns, our 
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involvement, and our responsive actions to those broader global issues which will 
increasingly impact on the Great Lakes region ... We need to think globally and act both 
locally and globally" (US National Climate Program and Canadian Climate Centre 1989, 17). 
A Law of the Atmosphere was also discussed in December 1988 at the Second North 
American Conference on Preparing for Climate Change held in Washington, DC. Sir Crispin 
Tickell, Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, remarked on the Law of 
the Atmosphere in his address to the conference. Counselling caution to those looking toward 
a Law of the Atmosphere, he noted that the Law of the Sea was not a total success, and that 
many governments, including those of the US and Britain, still could not accept all its 
elements. He argued that for now, "We should adopt a step by step approach ... until the need 
for international management or even regulation becomes manifest" (Tickell 1988, 4). 
Kilaparti Ramakrishna also advised against pursuing a Law of the Atmosphere in his address. 
He had helped compile the results of the Woods Hole workshop, which he presented in a 
paper "International legal and policy options for dealing with global warming and climatic 
change" (Ramakrishna 1988). He reiterated the conclusion reached at the workshop that at 
present a framework convention would be a more effective response to climate change than a 
Law of the Atmosphere. 
The negative reactions to a Law of the Atmosphere presented at the Woods Hole 
workshop and the Second North American Conference on Preparing for Climate Change, 
along with increasing calls for a single issue convention on climate change, helped set the 
tone at the last international meeting to discuss a Law of the Atmosphere, the 1989 Ottawa 
Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts. 
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1989 Ottawa Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts 
The Law of the Atmosphere did not leave the international stage quietly; it was the 
main topic of the international meeting promised by Canada only eight months prior at the 
1988 Toronto Conference. The Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts in Ottawa was 
sponsored by the Canadian Department of External Affairs (now referred to as Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade Canada) and Environment Canada. I requested a copy of the 
participants and proceedings of the Meeting of Experts from both departments under the 
Freedom of Information Act. Environment Canada replied that it had destroyed all records 
from the meeting, save the meeting statement. The Department of Foreign Affairs also failed 
to supply meeting proceedings, but did send the meeting statement and a list of the 18 
Canadian participants with the names of foreign participants blacked out but not the country 
of residence. Representatives from five international organizations and 32 countries, 
representing North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East 
attended the meeting. In total, there were 80 governmental, non-governmental, and academic 
legal and policy experts acting in their personal capacity. The three main goals of the meeting 
were: (i) to develop the legal and institutional framework for dealing with existing and 
emerging atmospheric problems by identifying potential elements for inclusion in a Law of 
the Atmosphere and a framework convention on climate change; (ii) to identify and work to 
overcome legal, technical, and scientific obstacles to consensus; and (iii) to develop a series 
of recommendations for future action (Department of External Affairs 1989). 
The statement of the Ottawa Meeting only addressed the first of these three goals. 
The first half of the statement was a draft convention for a Law of the Atmosphere 
(Appendix 2). The 24 articles included definitions of 'atmosphere' and 'atmospheric 
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interference', procedures to strengthen the convention through protocols, and promotion of 
atmospheric research and technology transfer (Department of External Affairs 1989). The 
second half of the statement listed elements to be considered in the development of a 
convention on climate change. Suggested elements included subjects of possible protocols, 
establishment of a Conference of Parties and Secretariat for the convention, and the creation 
of a World Climate Trust Fund (Department of External Affairs 1989). 
The Ottawa Meeting recognized that action to limit carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases was urgently needed, and offered two legal alternatives. The first was to 
proceed with negotiations for a Law of the Atmosphere while simultaneously proceeding 
with negotiations for priority protocols under the convention, and the second was to develop 
a climate change convention and a Law of the Atmosphere at the same time. 
I was unable to obtain the proceedings of the Ottawa Meeting but did interview three 
meeting participants. One interviewee, who had extensive experience in international 
negotiations, said that it could be sensed very quickly that a Law of the Atmosphere would 
go nowhere, and that it had already been overtaken by negotiations for climate change. 
Another stated that while the suggestion for a Law of the Atmosphere was not unwelcome to 
most participants, no one was particularly enthused about the idea. The same participant 
noted that the only people present at the Ottawa Meeting who were actively opposed to a 
Law of the Atmosphere were Mostafa Tolba, the Executive Director of UNEP, and the 
American representatives who reflected the non-interest of their government at the time in 
environmental issues. 
Tolba's (1989) address at the opening of the Ottawa Meeting, titled "A step-by-step 
approach to protection of the atmosphere," expressed his strong opposition to a Law of the 
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Atmosphere. He stated UNEP's support for the major recommendations of the Toronto 
Conference, but asserted, "[UNEP is] convinced that a 'Law of the Atmosphere' or a 'Law of 
the Air,' an all-inclusive global instrument for the protection of the atmosphere, is not our 
aim" (Tolba 1989, 304). He warned that pursuit of a Law of the Atmosphere might inhibit 
movement toward a meaningful response to climate change. He recalled the "frustrations and 
difficulties in the elaboration of the Law of the Sea" and said that he did not want to see 
UNEP take on a "Mission: Impossible" (Tolba 1989, 307), and argued that the state of 
atmospheric science at the time could not support a comprehensive policy response. Tolba 
(1989) concluded by saying that the present was not the time for a Law of the Atmosphere. 
At the time of his address, he was highly influential due to his recent success in negotiating 
the Montreal Protocol (Bodansky 1994). 
The disapproval expressed by the head of UNEP and the American delegation, and 
the general lack of enthusiasm for the idea of a Law of the Atmosphere, may have been 
decisive in the next step for the Law of the Atmosphere, which was no step at all. Following 
the Ottawa Meeting, to my knowledge, no further mention of a Law of the Atmosphere was 
made on the international stage in the years leading up to the 1992 UNCED (Smith 2001). 
Summary 
The Law of the Atmosphere enjoyed its highest level of exposure during Period 3 
(1988-1989). It was first introduced to the world at the 1988 Toronto Conference, and a 
drafted was crafted at the 1989 Ottawa Meeting. The idea was debated at various 
international meetings, but the feedback was generally not positive. The most notable 
opposition to the Law of the Atmosphere came from Mostafa Tolba. The Ottawa Meeting 
was well-attended, but it took place at a time when the Law of the Atmosphere was losing 
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ground. At the same time, the newly-created IPCC and its heavily endorsed work toward 
developing a single-issue climate convention was gaining momentum. 
Period 4: 1989-1992, Post-Ottawa Meeting to the UNCED 
The final section of this timeline spans the period following the Ottawa Meeting in 
1989 to the 1992 UNCED. The political and institutional components that could have made 
up a Law of the Atmosphere were still being developed and strengthened relative to the acid 
rain, stratospheric ozone, and climate change issues, but the idea to bring all under one 
umbrella convention faded from view. In this section, a Law of the Atmosphere is rarely 
mentioned; instead, the focus shifts to negotiations for a climate convention. 
The state of atmospheric politics 
Protocol negotiations and amendments for the Vienna and LRTAP conventions 
continued in the years leading up to the UNCED. In 1990, the Montreal Protocol was 
amended in London to add methyl chloroform, carbon tetrachloride, and other CFCs to the 
phase-out schedules for ozone-depleting substances, and a mechanism for providing financial 
and technical assistance to developing country parties was established. Adjustments were 
also made in 1990 and 1992 to accelerate the phase-out schedules for ozone-depleting 
substances. In 1988, the LRTAP Convention was extended by a protocol on nitrogen oxides, 
requiring a freeze on emissions of nitrogen oxides or their transboundary fluxes, and in 1991 
a protocol on volatile organic compounds was signed that specified three different options for 
emissions reduction, one of which had to be selected by a party upon signature or ratification. 
The much-anticipated WMO- and UNEP-sponsored WCC-II was held in Geneva 
from October 29 to November 7, 1990 (Jaeger and Ferguson 1991). Its main purpose was to 
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review the World Climate Program and to recommend policy actions. A key contribution was 
the timely completion of the IPCC's First Assessment Report. A series of non-governmental 
scientific sessions made up the first part of the conference, and attracted 747 scientists and 
technology experts from around the world. The scientific statement issued by the conference 
emphasized the risk of climate change, and the need for strong actions regardless of 
remaining scientific uncertainties (Jaeger and Ferguson 1991). The second part of the 
conference featured negotiations and discussions among heads of government and ministers 
from 137 states and the European Community. The Ministerial Declaration of the WCC-II 
called for a framework treaty on climate change to be ready for adoption at the 1992 
UNCED. It also expressed support for a number of principles that would later be included in 
the UNFCCC, such as labelling climate change a "common concern of humankind," the 
principle of equity, recognition of "common but differentiated responsibilities" of countries 
at different stages of development, the concept of sustainable development, and the 
precautionary principle (Jaeger and Ferguson 1991, 535-539). The conference statement did 
not set targets for carbon dioxide emissions reduction. The lack of such a commitment 
disappointed many in light of the high expectations and level of attention directed at the 
WCC-II; however, the conference was an important step toward creation of the UNFCCC. 
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (INC) was established in the month following the WCC-II under the 
auspices of the UN General Assembly and supported by UNEP and the WMO. Its mandate 
was to prepare "an effective framework convention on climate change, containing 
appropriate commitments, and any related instruments as might be agreed upon" to be ready 
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for signature at the 1992 UNCED (UN General Assembly December 21, 1990). The INC 
would go on to meet for six sessions prior to completing negotiations for the UNFCCC. 
America's position on climate change and international environmental regulation 
The first session of the INC was hosted by the US in February 1991. The US had 
called for a framework treaty on climate change, but rejected any form of targets and 
timetables based on projected economic impacts. In contrast, environment ministers from 
other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
were advocating recognition of the precautionary principle, and a number of European states 
were calling for targets and timetables (Park 2000). 
The Republicans held power under presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr. 
(who succeeded Reagan in 1989) in the US from 1981 to 1993. While the stance of the Bush 
administration could be classified as less ideologically opposed to negotiations for a climate 
convention than the Reagan administration, it was nevertheless similar (Park 2000). The 
response of the Bush administration to climate change politics was shaped by three main 
principles (Hecht and Tirpak 1995, 373): 
I. Actions taken by governments should be based on a 'no regrets' policy, 
involving policies and programs useful in their own right. This was a 
reflection of the uncertainty of climate change science. 
II. Actions should reflect a 'comprehensive approach', including all greenhouse 
gases and all sources and sinks. This reflected their support for market 
approaches to protect the environment. 
III. Actions should be voluntary with non-binding targets and timetables. This 
echoed the Republican ideal of non-government interference in regulating the 
environment. 
American refusal to agree on binding emissions targets was based on their unease at 
projected economic impacts and the skepticism of much of the scientific work on climate 
change (Rowlands 1995; Hecht and Tirpak 1995). A study released by the Council of 
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Economic Advisors in 1990 projected the cost of reducing America's carbon dioxide 
emissions by twenty percent by 2100 to be between 800 billion and 3.6 trillion US dollars 
(Rowlands 1995). It was often cited by US officials to justify their national and international 
stance on climate change regulation. President Bush left the management of international 
climate change policy in the hands of the Domestic Policy Committee. One of the 
committee's most influential members, the Chief of Staff of the White House, John Sununu, 
was skeptical of results generated by the general circulation models (GCMs) used by the US 
team on the IPCC assessments because of the 500 kilometres grid scale used by these first-
generation models. On this basis, he deemed that GCMs were not credible and could not be 
used in policy formulation (Miles 2002). It has also been argued that Sununu and other 
members of the Domestic Policy Committee were motivated first and foremost by limiting 
economic consequences to domestic industries, such as manufacturing and energy, in their 
stand against targets for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Park 2000). Despite 
international criticism, the US maintained its position against binding emissions targets 
throughout the sessions of the INC. In fact, the Bush administration threatened to boycott the 
UNCED if a climate convention containing specific targets was forwarded at the conference 
(Rowlands 1995). In the end, American preferences prevailed, and the UNFCCC required no 
specific commitments of its signatories. 
Changes and challenges in Canadian climate change politics 
Canada's role as leader for a Law of the Atmosphere and climate change diminished 
following the 1989 Ottawa Meeting (Smith 2001). Between 1989 and the first INC session in 
early 1991, domestic climate change politics in Canada were marked by increasing 
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marginalization of Canadian scientists in the policy process and activism against 
international regulation by the provinces and the oil and gas industry. 
Canada's stint as an international leader for climate change and advocate of a Law of 
the Atmosphere had been supported by the considerable technical expertise it held in 
atmospheric science, especially within the AES (Smith 2001). At the time, most atmospheric 
scientists employed by the federal government worked in AES, and AES held a prominent 
position at the intersection between atmospheric science and policy (Parson et al. 2001). The 
implications of scientific knowledge on the atmosphere on the policy making process were 
being examined by bodies such as the AES Advisory Committee on Stratospheric Pollution 
and the Canadian Climate Program Board. These senior advisory committees, made up of 
scientists and officials, reviewed and prioritized research efforts, and drew implications for 
policy (Parson et al. 2001). However, as the issue of climate change became increasingly 
political and driven by economics, scientists in Environment Canada were marginalized in 
the policy process (Bernstein 2003). The senior atmospheric scientists comprising the 
Canadian team at INC sessions were replaced after 1991 when the international affairs 
section of Environment Canada responsible for climate change negotiations began to fill 
delegations ranks with economists and international relations specialists (Bernstein 2003). 
The landscape of climate change politics in Canada was also being influenced by the 
domestic forces that had mobilized against international climate change regulation following 
the call made at the Toronto Conference for a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005. 
The Canadian economy is energy intensive, and relies heavily on exports, which produces 
both internal and external constraints in emissions-reduction policies (Bernstein 2003). 
Internal constraints involved relative costs and benefits of abatement measures, and external 
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constraints involved concerns over trade and competiveness, especially in relation to the US, 
Canada's largest trading partner. The oil and gas industry, which the federal government 
consulted during negotiations, aimed to sway Canadian support away from international 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions (Macdonald and Smith 1999/2000). Canadian 
provinces were another significant domestic political actor mobilized by the call made at the 
Toronto Conference and were consulted during negotiations. The complexities of Canadian 
federalism and interdepartmental competition severely complicated the issue of climate 
change regulation (Smith 2001). Conflict of interests emerged between Environment Canada, 
the traditional leader on climate change, and Natural Resources Canada, the leader on 
domestic implementations (Bernstein 2003). Environment Canada advocated global action, 
while Natural Resources Canada focused on economic implications for energy and resource 
industries. In addition, there was conflict over the division of federal and provincial powers 
in climate change regulation. Many elements implicated in climate change fell under 
provincial jurisdiction or under joint federal/provincial mandates (Bernstein 2003). The 
provinces increasingly sought inclusion on Canadian negotiating teams, but the federal 
government usually refused (Parson et al. 2001). Canadian provinces were reluctant to 
support any emissions reduction strategies they perceived would come at a high economic 
cost. 
The changes and challenges in Canadian climate change policy between 1989 and 
1992 help explain the transformation of Canada from a leader for a Law of the Atmosphere 
to a "laggard" in climate policy both internationally and domestically after 1992 (Bernstein 
2003, 85). During the INC sessions, Canada sought to narrow the divisions between the US 
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and European Community, and opted to travel the middle road in supporting a 
comprehensive stabilization commitment (Smith 2001). 
UNFCCC opens for signature at UNCED 
At the UNCED, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the UNFCCC and 
his government became one of the first to ratify the treaty. Although Mulroney had made the 
first call for a Law of the Atmosphere on the world stage and expressed his desire to see a 
Law of the Atmosphere completed for the UNCED, he made no mention of the idea at the 
conference. The step-by-step approach had prevailed: the UNFCCC, one of the crowning 
achievements of the UNCED, was signed by 154 states at Rio de Janeiro. Its ultimate 
objective was to achieve "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level at would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" 
(UnitedNationsl992,4). 
Even though the UNFCCC did not contain binding targets, some European and 
OECD states chose to unilaterally declare specific and sometimes aggressive targets and 
timetables. Canada opted for a more moderate goal to stabilize carbon dioxide and 
greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by 2000. American President George Bush, Sr. signed the 
treaty and committed the US to early ratification. He also pledged to develop a national 
climate change action plan by January 1993 (Hecht and Tirpak 1995). The US ratified the 
UNFCCC on October 15, 1992. 
Summary 
The Law of the Atmosphere faded from the international stage during Period 4 (1989-
1992). Canada's ability to lead was compromised by domestic constraints and the 
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marginalization of its atmospheric scientists in policy. Regulation for acid rain and 
stratospheric ozone depletion continued to develop, as did plans for a framework convention 
on climate change. The UNFCCC eventually forwarded for signature at the UNCED 
reflected American preferences and marked the closing of the window of opportunity for a 
Law of the Atmosphere. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, a timeline of events, key to understanding the birth and death of the 
idea for a Law of the Atmosphere, was presented. The timeline began by tracing the rising 
international regulation and politicization of atmospheric issues in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
In 1986, the idea to bring all the interrelated problems of the atmosphere under one 
comprehensive treaty was conceived, and in 1988, the idea of a Law of the Atmosphere was 
presented to the world. The goal was to have a Law of the Atmosphere treaty prepared for the 
1992 UNCED. Between 1988 and 1989, a Law of the Atmosphere was drafted and debated at 
various international meetings, but after 1989 it was eclipsed by work on the climate change 
convention. The 1992 deadline for a Law of the Atmosphere came, and went. In the next 
chapter, key factors that explain the failure of the Law of the Atmosphere to become reality 
are identified, organized, and analysed. The key actors related to these key factors are 
displayed in Table 3. Only actors that help explain the nonregime outcome are listed in the 
table. 
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Table 3: Key actors in the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime 
Individual actors 
Howard Ferguson 
Brian Mulroney 
Tom McMillan 
Mostafa Tolba 
State actors 
Canada 
United States 
Organizational actors 
UNEP 
UN General Assembly 
AES (Environment Canada) 
IPCC 
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Chapter 4: Analysis of the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime, 1988-1992 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I answer my research question: What factors explain why a Law of the 
Atmosphere failed to become a regime during its 1988 to 1992 window of opportunity? I 
return to the table of regime formation summary factors from Chapter 2 (Table 2), and, using 
the timeline presented in Chapter 3 as backdrop, seek to explain the Law of the Atmosphere 
nonregime. I identified what summary factors were important and their relative importance. I 
conducted a subjectively quantitative analysis to determine relative influence using document 
analysis and interviews with participants who were active in the policy and/or science 
process during the 1988-1992 time period. 
I started with the assumption that all summary factors had no influence. If a summary 
factor was identified as influential in a document or interview, its influence on the Law of the 
Atmosphere nonregime was assumed to increase each time it was mentioned. I divided the 
relative influence of summary factors into three categories: high influence, moderate 
influence, and low or no influence (Table 4). This chapter is divided into three sections based 
on this categorization scheme. In the first section (high influence), the three most important 
summary factors that contributed to the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime are discussed in 
order of influence. I chose to identify only three as high influence because they were 
mentioned in documents and interviews far more often than moderate influence factors. In 
the second section (moderate influence), four summary factors that had modest influence are 
discussed. Moderate influence summary factors were mentioned, but substantially less often 
than the three high influence summary factors. In the third section (low influence), the two 
summary factors that had little or no influence are discussed. Low influence summary factors 
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were not mentioned at all. For each summary factor, only the (sub-) factors that I found to be 
relevant to the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime are listed and addressed. 
Table 4. Rating of factor influence on the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime 
Factor High influence Moderate 
influence Low influence 
Available solutions 
Leadership 
Issue characteristics 
Policy area 
Resource-user characteristics 
Knowledge 
Context 
Interest and payoff 
Power 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
High influence factors 
Available solutions 
In the 1980s the international community was confronted with four known 
international atmospheric problems, two of which were regional in scale (acid rain and Arctic 
haze2) and two of which were global in scale (stratospheric ozone depletion and climate 
change). This triggered a debate on how best to deal with this collection of problems from a 
political rather than scientific perspective—with a Law of the Atmosphere, or something 
else? "Something else" was chosen. 
The most important summary factor explaining the failure of the Law of the 
Atmosphere to form between 1988 and 1992 was available solutions relative to this 
collection of atmospheric problems, which refers to solutions, specifically institutional 
2
 Arctic haze was not discussed in Chapter 3 because it did not contribute to the Law of the Atmosphere debate. 
However, it was a regional-scale air pollution problem subject to intense research efforts in the 1980s (Soroos 
1992, 1993). 
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options, available to combat a problem. One sub-factor related to available solutions 
influenced the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Salient solutions: The existence and appeal of simple or familiar solutions helps 
regime negotiations to succeed. Salient solutions offer uncomplicated formulas that 
are intuitively appealing or borrow familiar formulas from prior cases. They can also 
be easily explained to policymakers and the general public. 
Salient solutions in the case of the Law of the Atmosphere refered to institutional structures 
that could facilitate solving international problems related to the atmosphere, not solving the 
problems themselves. Two options emerged by the late 1980s: non-integrated, single-issue 
conventions to tackle individual problems, and an integrated, umbrella convention to protect 
the atmosphere as a whole. Both options were familiar solutions in that the international 
community had experience with both types. 
Comprehensive approach 
The Law of the Sea was the only comprehensive convention that could provide a 
model for governing the atmosphere as a whole. The 1988-1992 window of opportunity for a 
Law of the Atmosphere falls in the decade long gap between the end of the Law of the Sea 
negotiations in 1982 and its entry into force in 1994. The legacy of difficulties encountered in 
the marathon Law of the Sea negotiations cast a long shadow over the idea for a Law of the 
Atmosphere and significantly contributed to its failure to become a regime. 
Two interviewees expressly commented on the negative influence. One stated that the 
"main obstacle [to a Law of the Atmosphere] was the experience to the time with the Law of 
the Sea, i.e. that major players had not become parties to or ratified the Law of the Sea, so 
even a long time after it had been negotiated, it was not legally binding." Another pointed out 
that the Law of the Sea was just "sitting there, it wasn't going anywhere [when the Law of 
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the Atmosphere was introduced]. Even a country like Canada, which had been such a 
promoter of the Law of the Sea ... it took Canada decades to ratify it." A third did not refer to 
the Law of the Sea specifically but to the experience with an umbrella convention generally: 
"the idea of an umbrella agreement was considered too complicated for people who wanted 
to focus particularly on the climate warming problem." 
In an address to the Second North American Conference on Preparing for Climate 
Change, British UN ambassador Sir Crispin Tickell (1988) used an analogy with the Law of 
the Sea to argue against a Law of the Atmosphere. Similarly, Edward Miles (1998) referred 
to the decade of his life spent in Law of the Sea negotiations to urge the US not to pursue a 
Law of the Atmosphere. The head of UNEP, Mostafa Tolba (1989, 307), also cited "the 
frustrations and difficulties in the elaboration of the Law of the Sea." The timing and 
problems of the Law of the Sea and its negotiating process were viewed as warning against a 
Law of the Atmosphere. 
Single-issue approach 
All interviewees commented on advantages of the single-issue approach. One 
explained that a "specific, narrower convention could be negotiated and implemented" faster 
than a comprehensive convention. A second said that negotiations for single-issue 
conventions were faster since the topic would be narrow and focused, and that "things could 
actually get through and done." A third claimed, "What we've done internationally and 
nationally is to focus on the individual problems rather than looking at the overall situation. I 
guess the isolated solutions are preferred by that level of policy making and politics rather 
than the integrated solutions that would be represented by a Law of the Atmosphere." A 
fourth said that a climate convention was chosen over a Law of the Atmosphere because "we 
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needed something more specific. If you look at the Law of the Sea convention you'll realize 
it deals with a whole range of issues ... and the movement from Law of the Sea to climate 
change was just a more functional focus." And the fifth explained that the dominance of the 
climate convention can be explained by the fact that "you can handle [atmospheric problems] 
on piecemeal, issue-by-issue basis. That's what we've done, so that's the evidence 
[supporting this approach]." 
The model for a single-issue, atmospheric-related global convention came from the 
highly successful 1985 Vienna Convention and its 1987 Montreal Protocol. The shadow cast 
over the Law of the Atmosphere process by the Law of the Sea experience appeared even 
darker when compared to the speed and success of the Montreal Protocol (Sebenius 1991, 
117). Negotiations for the Montreal Protocol were concluded relatively quickly, and it was 
implemented ahead of schedule (Zaelke and Cameron 1990). The Montreal Protocol was 
supported by key developed states and hailed as international cooperation at its finest. The 
Montreal Protocol seemed to illustrate and validate the effectiveness of a step-by-step 
approach to protection of the atmosphere. 
The Montreal Protocol was also the pet project of Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director 
of UNEP. Tolba drew on the success of the Montreal Protocol to strengthen his argument 
against the proposed Law of the Atmosphere. Despite the express purpose of the 1989 
Ottawa Meeting to elaborate on the plan for a Law of the Atmosphere, Tolba, in his address 
to participants, actively sought to dissuade them from creating a Law of the Atmosphere: "If 
we had reached too far at Montreal, we would almost certainly have come away empty-
handed. Instead, UNEP shaped a protocol ... which is proving to be quite a radical 
instrument" (Tolba 1989, 305). He went on to argue that in light of the experience with the 
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Montreal Protocol, specific and separate agreements and action plans would be a more 
prudent choice than a comprehensive convention. 
The single-issue approach to protecting the atmosphere was further supported in 
various international forums. At the international Woods Hole workshop, participants 
decided that pursuit of a climate convention was the most prudent choice, and that a Law of 
the Atmosphere would prove too ambitious a goal and could inhibit real action on climate 
change. The single-issue approach was also the solution of choice for the IPCC. At a meeting 
in October 1989, the IPCC's Working Group III (policy responses panel) was expressing full 
support for a climate convention based on the framework-protocol approach taken for 
protection of the stratospheric ozone layer. In the same month, it presented a draft list of 
elements for inclusion in the future framework convention at a plenary meeting of the IPCC 
(Zaelke and Cameron 1990). 
Indirect support for the single-issue approach also came in the form of endorsements 
of the work of the IPCC. The IPCC's efforts toward a climate convention were approved in a 
resolution by the UN General Assembly in December 1989, and endorsed in the 1989 
Declaration of the Hague, the 1989 Noordwijk Ministerial Declaration, and by the G7. 
IPCC's push for a climate convention and its high-profile endorsements helped doom the 
idea for a Law of the Atmosphere. The pursuit of a climate convention had gained too much 
momentum to be slowed down by an unwieldy umbrella agreement. 
Summary: Salient Solutions 
Two salient solutions were available to address the problem of atmospheric change: 
comprehensive and single issue. Each was evaluated in part based on experiences to date. 
The comprehensive approach was heavily defined by the recent experience with the Law of 
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the Sea and the complexity of governing the entire global oceanic commons under a single 
umbrella convention. Opponents of the Law of the Atmosphere argued that governing the 
global atmospheric commons using the same approach would have the same undesirable 
results. The timing of the 1988 proposal for a Law of the Atmosphere—it fell between the 
1982 conclusion of the final Law of the Sea conference and its 1994 entry into force—also 
contributed to the failure of the Law of the Atmosphere. The second salient solution available 
was the single-issue approach. There were prominent supporters of a climate convention, 
most notably the IPCC. Preference for the single-issue approach was reinforced by the recent 
success of the Montreal Protocol, which was lauded as one of the most successful instances 
of international environmental governance. Both the Law of the Sea and the Montreal 
Protocol were used to argue against creating a Law of the Atmosphere. These agreements 
were significant in a world experiencing its second—or internationalization—wave of 
environmentalism, and timely relative to the introduction of the Law of the Atmosphere. All 
interviewees and most documents forwarded arguments related to the available solutions 
summary factor; hence, I rated this summary factor as the most significant in explaining the 
Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
While the two salient solutions, comprehensive and single-issue, may appear 
mutually exclusive in this analysis, they were not. According to the Canadian architects of a 
Law of the Atmosphere, a climate convention could have been developed alongside a Law of 
the Atmosphere, and the climate convention could have been later brought under the 
umbrella convention. Toronto Conference Director, Howard Ferguson, explained that this 
distinction—that the two solutions could complement rather than compete with one 
another—was not made clear at the 1988 Toronto Conference. The failure to clarify and 
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define the Law of the Atmosphere during the idea's initial introduction on the world stage 
may have led to later widespread interpretations that the two solutions were in competition 
(Sebenius 1991; Zaelke and Cameron 1990) and that climate change would continue 
unchecked through long-winded negotiations for a Law of the Atmosphere. Although the two 
solutions were not designed to be mutually exclusive, they were generally treated as such. 
The remaining eight summary factors fed into the 'competition' between the climate 
convention and the Law of the Atmosphere. 
Leadership 
The second most important summary factor that inhibited the Law of the Atmosphere 
from forming was leadership. The leadership summary factor refers to the presence of a 
strong and consistent leader who champions an issue for regime formation. Leadership can 
be exercised by an individual or a state. Two factors were incorporated into this summary 
factor and both influenced the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Individuals as leaders: The presence of strong and consistent individual leadership 
leads to regime formation. Individuals who exercise leadership aim to overcome 
collective-action problems by promoting regime formation to involved parties. There 
are different forms of individual leadership that can be exercised (even 
simultaneously) in regime negotiations, but only the emergence of some form of 
individual leadership is necessary to increase the likelihood of regime formation. 
Strong leadership: Strong leaders help establish and encourage collective action to 
govern a commons. Leaders, or mobilizers, issue empowerment messages that 
emphasize the value of collective action and the importance of individual efforts 
coordinated with others. Empowerment messages raise expectations of the 
contribution that others will make, and can help jump start collective action to govern 
and protect a commons. 
The three individual leaders who were most prominent in supporting a Law of the 
Atmosphere were Canadians who were active in the policy arena. The most notable 
individual leader who opposed it (because he supported a climate convention) was Mostafa 
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Tolba. The only state leader for a Law of the Atmosphere was Canada. There were no states 
that were actively opposed to a Law of the Atmosphere. The US resisted the idea but was not 
actively lobbying against it. 
An interviewee who attended the Ottawa Meeting said, "I didn't get the feeling that 
the suggestion [of a Law of the Atmosphere] was unwelcome on the part of most the 
participants, possibly excepting the Americans representatives there who weren't interested 
in doing anything about the environment ... The American policy people that attended that 
meeting were reflecting the view of the US government at that time. Reagan was president, 
and his Republican administration was not enthused at any action on the environment." The 
same interviewee expressed the belief that "the [Law of the Atmosphere] involving an 
international umbrella convention or treaty, really needed a prominent international sponsor 
such as Al Gore, Tolba, Obama - these are the sorts of people that would need to pick up the 
ball and run with it for it to fly internationally." Such sponsors appeared but their leadership 
was short lived. The Law of the Atmosphere was a Canadian idea, and it had a number of 
influential Canadians promoting it on the world stage. By tracing the fate of these Canadians 
and Canada itself as a leader, the nonregime outcome of the Law of the Atmosphere can be 
better understood. 
Initial leaders for a Law of the Atmosphere 
Howard Ferguson, head of Environment Canada's AES, was the first person to 
introduce the idea for Law of the Atmosphere. He did so at the First North American 
Conference on Preparing for Climate Change in 1987, and went on to promote the idea at 
various international conferences until the Ottawa Meeting in February 1989. Thereafter, he 
left Environment Canada in June 1989 to organize the WCC-II held in Geneva in late 1990. 
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He was the most active individual leader for a Law of the Atmosphere, but he did not 
continue to press for it after the Ottawa Meeting because he became totally preoccupied with 
the task of organizing the conference (interview with Howard Ferguson, October 27, 2009). 
Tom McMillan, Canadian Minister of the Environment, was also a leader for a Law 
of the Atmosphere for a short period of time. He proclaimed at the 1988 Toronto Conference 
that "The Government of Canada is passionately committed to the concept of an International 
Law of the Air" (WMO 1988, 34). However, he was voted out of office in a general election 
only five months after his speech. The new Minister of the Environment, Lucien Bouchard, 
made no public reference to a Law of the Atmosphere. 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, representing Canada as a whole, was another 
ephemeral leader for the Law of the Atmosphere. He pitched the idea at the 1988 Toronto 
Conference, and announced that Canada would host a follow-up meeting in 1989 to further 
develop it. Despite his apparent enthusiasm, Mulroney did not continue to promote a Law of 
the Atmosphere after the Ottawa Meeting. His failure to maintain Canada's role as leader for 
a Law of the Atmosphere was due to both domestic and external constraints. 
On the domestic front, the recommendations of the Toronto Conference alerted the 
provinces, oil and gas industries, and other domestic actors that they would be negatively 
affected by regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and began mobilizing in opposition 
(Macdonald and Smith 1999/2000). Smith (2001) and Bernstein (2003) have argued that 
Canada's claim to leadership on climate change was tempered by domestic sources of foreign 
policy, in particular the provincial governments. MacDonald and Smith (1999/2000, 116) 
have observed that Canada's commitment to stabilize emissions at UNCED in 1992 instead 
of pursuing aggressive reductions in the manner of a number of European Community is 
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"testimony to the fact that domestic and international forces had coalesced to constrain 
overly enthusiastic initiatives." Domestic opposition in Canada weakened the country's 
ability to push for a comprehensive treaty. 
Another domestic constraint on Canada's role as leader for a Law of the Atmosphere 
was the gradual sidelining of science. As the issue of climate change became more 
politicized, Canadian scientists were increasingly marginalized in shaping climate change 
policy. Canada's year-long stint as an international leader for a Law of the Atmosphere was 
made possible by the technical expertise housed in AES (Smith 2001). The idea for a Law of 
the Atmosphere had come from atmospheric scientists in AES, but during climate change 
negotiations, they were cut from the Canadian negotiating team. 
The US comprised the strongest external constraint on Canada's leadership for a Law 
of the Atmosphere. An interviewee flagged the Canada-US relationship as a stumbling block, 
stating that "Mulroney was certainly trying to be the best of friends with Reagan, and the 
Reagan attitude toward any action on climate change (or other international agreements on 
environmental concerns) was very cool, which probably influenced Mulroney not to push the 
issue." Smith (2001) and Parson (2001) point out that Canada's economy is closely tied to 
the economy of the US, and Canadian policy development is constrained by US parameters. 
Smith also observes that the Mulroney government compromised its position on 
environmental issues in order to maintain a friendly relationship with the US. 
Summary: Leadership 
The lack of a strong and consistent leader for a Law of the Atmosphere contributed to 
its demise. The government of Canada and individuals within the government demonstrated 
leadership, but it was short-lived. No long-term leaders for a Law of the Atmosphere 
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emerged. A climate change convention, however, did have strong leaders. Mostafa Tolba was 
one. He announced UNEP's support for a climate convention over a Law of the Atmosphere 
at the Ottawa Meeting. One interviewee who attended the Ottawa Meeting stated that if a 
person as influential as Tolba "came in and said [the idea for a Law of the Atmosphere] is 
crap, you wouldn't need too many interventions like that for everyone to turn around and say 
'Oh, absolute crap, I don't know what the hell I'm doing here, waste of time.'" With Tolba 
leading the movement for a climate convention and no one consistently leading for a Law of 
the Atmosphere, the competition between the two solutions can be better understood. The 
leadership summary factor strengthened the single-issue approach, and Tolba's active 
opposition to a Law of the Atmosphere likely weakened the comprehensive approach. 
Issue characteristics 
The third most important summary factor that explains the Law of the Atmosphere 
nonregime is issue characteristics. The issue characteristics summary factor refers to the 
nature of the issue in question, especially in regard to its ease and likelihood of governance. 
Two factors were incorporated into issue characteristics and both were relevant to the Law of 
the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Resource characteristics: Successful commons governance is easier when the 
resource is small, uniform, simple and predictable. A smaller size usually means 
fewer users and makes the resource easier to monitor. Other resource characteristics 
that aid in commons governance are a relatively small number of negative 
externalities from resource use and the ability to discern stable and well-delineated 
boundaries around the resource. If a resource is part of a complex system, it is more 
difficult for resource-users to agree on rules to address the numerous externalities. 
Clear boundaries make identification of resource-users and the extent of their use 
easier to determine. Resources that are time dependent are less likely to be governed 
than those that are not. That is, a renewable resource with a replacement rate that 
grossly exceeds the withdrawal rate, or a resource with a withdrawal rate that grossly 
exceeds the replacement rate to the current point of near-destruction is less likely to 
be governed. 
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Issue properties: In dissensual conflicts, actors disagree on what is desirable for 
them individually and collectively. A dissensual conflict about values is the most 
difficult to regulate because values cannot be negotiated, while a dissensual conflict 
about means to achieve an agreed upon end is more likely to lead to regime 
formation. In consensual conflicts, actors all desire the same object, but no one can be 
fully satisfied. A consensual conflict about relatively assessed goods is difficult to 
regulate because it often sparks intense competition, while a consensual conflict about 
absolutely assessed goods is more likely to lead to regime formation. 
Resource characteristics 
The atmosphere is an extremely complex system, and one of the few truly global 
commons. It has a number of characteristics that make it a challenge to govern. First, the 
atmosphere is not a small, simple, or predictable resource. It envelopes our planet and the 
complexity of the interactions between its components (including the human component) 
make scientific predictions and certainty difficult. Second, the atmosphere has no clear 
boundaries. Pollution can flow from one state to the next and around the world, and no state 
can make exclusive use of the atmosphere within its state boundaries. Third, the degradation 
of the atmosphere is an externality. The atmosphere is used as a sink for the pollution that 
accompanies transportation, industrial activity, and a myriad of other modern activities. 
Fourth, the atmosphere has low excludability and high rivalry. Excludability is low because 
no one can be excluded from using the atmosphere. Rivalry is high because one user's 
consumption of the atmosphere (i.e. as a sink) comes at the expense of another user's 
consumption. Fifth, the atmosphere is a relatively assessed good. The value of the 
atmosphere varies significantly depending on the resource-user. For instance, some prioritize 
economic development over environmental protection. 
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Complexity of the atmosphere and the nonregime 
One interviewee noted, "you really have to screw up badly before the conclusion is 
that you need a Law of the Atmosphere." In other words, the atmosphere can be 
characterized as a complex and resilient system. The same interviewee claimed "climate 
change is a simpler idea since it deals with a specific issue [instead of all atmospheric 
problems at once]." Hence, the climate was seemingly being characterized as a less complex 
system. 
Soroos (1998, 34) writes that, "One of the reasons why there has been so little 
progress toward a law of the atmosphere is that the atmosphere is an undifferentiated mass of 
gases that is constantly circulating over the surface of the planet." Najam (2000, 4047) 
argued the case for a Law of the Atmosphere but conceded that the issue-by-issue approach 
was based on certain substantive conveniences: "the atmosphere is an extremely complex 
system; and one that is still much less than well understood. Trying to tackle sub-systems ... 
and the myriad of scientific uncertainties associated with them is difficult enough in itself." 
In his speech to the Ottawa Meeting, Mostafa Tolba (1989) described how the various 
problems in the atmosphere are interdependent, noting that CFCs are also greenhouse gases, 
and that thinning ozone leads to acid rain, the greenhouse effect, and other pollution 
problems. However, Tolba also drew on the characteristics of the atmosphere to argue 
against a Law of the Atmosphere. He explained that the range of threats to the atmosphere 
"differs so much spatially, temporally, and qualitatively that it is difficult - at this stage, 
effectively impossible - to perceive their being encompassed in a single instrument." Tolba 
(1989, 305-306) also questioned "the efficacy of an umbrella convention for all atmospheric 
problems, which include issues as yet unquantified and ill-defined." 
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Summary: Issue characteristics 
The difficulties of regulating the entire atmospheric system under one umbrella 
convention inhibited the plan for a Law of the Atmosphere. A number of characteristics of 
the atmosphere make it a difficult resource to govern. The argument that the atmosphere is an 
integrated whole and should be governed as such made sense on a scientific level but fell 
apart on the political level. Science could point to the connections and relations of 
atmospheric components, but policymakers could only see the "procedural nightmare" 
(Najam 2000, 4047) in negotiating and implementing a Law of the Atmosphere. As a result, 
the complexity of the atmospheric system worked against formation of a Law of the 
Atmosphere. Even though climate change was extremely complex in itself and ridden with 
uncertainties, it was deemed more tractable at this time than an comprehensive approach. 
Moderate influence factors 
Policy area 
A fourth summary factor that inhibited the Law of the Atmosphere regime was the 
policy area. Policy areas are broad sets of issues and their governing institutions that can be 
distinguished and categorized by their value and subject (e.g. environment, economy, human 
rights). The policy area summary factor refers to the influence on regime formation of 
characteristics of the policy area in which an issue exists. Three factors are incorporated into 
policy area, and all are relevant to understanding the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Integration: Integration among states usually begins in limited functional and 
economic areas. Integration generally increases over time and is difficult to reverse. If 
relevant states are well integrated and process a high density and wide spectrum of 
transactions, then regime formation is more likely. 
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Normative-institutional: A regime is more likely to form when an issue belongs to a 
policy area already structured by international institutions. Existing international 
organizations influence regime formation by providing a forum for further 
development and setting a precedent for cooperation. Existing institutions also serve 
as models or focal points for creating a new regime. 
Policy priority: There are two lines of research on the influence that an issue's 
priority on the policy agenda has on regime formation. The first and more prominent 
is that an issue's high priority on the policy agenda can contribute to success in 
regime formation. The second is that a regime is more likely to form when it is not 
high priority on the agenda of parties. 
A Law of the Atmosphere falls into the international environmental policy area. 
Within this area, the issues and institutions with the most bearing on the Law of the 
Atmosphere nonregime were those related to either the atmosphere specifically or to global 
commons in general. From 1988 to 1992, the most relevant issues and their governing 
institutions were those related to stratospheric ozone depletion and acid rain, and to 
governing of the ocean commons. During the window of opportunity for a Law of the 
Atmosphere, work was still in progress to develop further protocols to the LRTAP 
Convention (acid rain) and amendments to the Montreal Protocol (ozone). As already noted, 
negotiations for the Law of the Sea had concluded in 1982, but the treaty did not enter into 
force until 1994. Hence, it is clear that the policy area in which debate over a Law of the 
Atmosphere occurred was already structured by international institutions involving a high 
density of transactions between states (normative-institutional and integration). This created 
conditions conducive to forming a Law of the Atmosphere; however, it was also conducive 
to forming a climate change regime. 
When the policy priority factor is added to the equation, though, the scales were 
tipped in favour of climate change. From 1988 to 1992, addressing the immediate problem of 
climate change was a higher priority than addressing all the interrelated problems of the 
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atmosphere. An interviewee explained that the Law of the Atmosphere was "overtaken by a 
single issue, which was climate change, and you can't carry too many topics on the agenda at 
any one time ... You only have so much energy, you only have so many people, and the 
political agenda as it evolved became focused on climate change and people weren't going to 
share that limelight with something called Law of the Atmosphere." 
The need for international policy on climate change helped opened the window for 
the idea of Law of the Atmosphere, and the Law of the Atmosphere fed off the momentum of 
the perceived need for international action on climate change, yet the climate change 
convention received far more endorsements and international attention. Climate change was a 
higher priority (Ramakrishna and Woodwell 1989; Ramakrishna 1988). 
Resource-user characteristics 
A fifth summary factor that inhibited the Law of the Atmosphere from becoming a 
regime was resource-user characteristics. The resource-user characteristics summary factor 
refers to characteristics of the users that draw on a common resource that affect the 
likelihood of regime formation. Three factors from resource-user characteristics had a 
bearing on the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Number of players: A small number of players are more likely to cooperate to form 
a regime because they are able to sustain full cooperation in a self-enforcing 
agreement. An agreement among a large number of players can only improve 
marginally on the outcome of non-cooperation. Large-scale cooperation is difficult to 
achieve and usually does not produce significant results. An agreement involving a 
large number of players is either narrow instead of wide or shallow instead of deep. 
Issue linkage makes large-scale cooperation more likely. 
Resource-user characteristics: Resource-users are most likely to create common-
property institutions when the number of users is small enough to keep 
communication and decision-making costs low and when appropriators reside 
permanently near or in the resource. At the local level, a lower degree of homogeneity 
among resource-users makes users more likely to organize to govern a commons. At 
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the global level, heterogeneity in capabilities, preferences, and information and 
beliefs usually facilitates cooperation but occasionally may not, depending on the 
context. Resource-users that share a long term vision for the resource and its benefits 
are more able to successful govern a commons. A moderate to heavy level of resource 
use also encourages resource-user cooperation, as they attempt to prevent overuse. 
History of user organization: Resource users with a history of interaction and prior 
experience with at least minimal levels of organization are more likely to cooperate to 
govern a commons. Prior experience can be through the presence of a general purpose 
organizational structure (i.e. a village council), or a specialized organizational 
structure related to the resource, but without prior management responsibilities (i.e. 
an airplane club). Experience with organization can also be fulfilled by the presence 
of nearby organizations that have helped others govern similar commons issues. 
All individuals are resource-users of the atmosphere, and a state is a collection of 
individual users within a border. However, since states (not individuals) are involved in 
international regime formation, I treat each state as a single resource-user in this analysis. It 
is obvious that the number of players involved in regulating the atmosphere would be very 
high; this made formation of a Law of the Atmosphere less likely. An interviewee pointed 
out that unlike negotiations for an umbrella convention, with a single-issue convention "you 
could drive stuff through because it tended to be rather narrow and rather focused and 
implicated a limited number of countries or people or industrial sectors. That's attractive, 
because you can actually get stuff done." 
All states draw on the atmosphere, but it is not a resource that is shared equally 
among users. During the window of opportunity for a Law of the Atmosphere, the main 
responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions lay with developed nations. The US alone was 
responsible for one-fourth of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Energy 
Information Administration 2006). At the same time, greenhouse gas emissions of states 
moving toward development (especially India and China) were on the rise due to the high 
energy demands of vital development (Sebenius 1991). The economic disparity among 
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resource-users and the unequal use of the atmosphere as a sink for emissions by resource-
users are key characteristics that make the atmosphere extremely difficult to govern. 
There was a history of cooperation among states to combat global environmental 
issues—protecting the stratospheric ozone layer, banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, 
establishing the Law of the Sea conventions, and safeguarding the Antarctic. These 
agreements all demonstrate a history of user-organization to protect global common-pool 
resources. However, in the case of the Law of the Sea, the history of user-organization was 
not necessarily deemed positive. On the other hand, the history of user-organization to 
protect components of the atmosphere was quite positive, especially with the success of the 
Montreal Protocol. Therefore, it may be that the history of user-organization made formation 
of a single-issue climate regime formation more likely and a Law of the Atmosphere less 
likely. 
Knowledge 
A sixth summary factor that contributed to the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime is 
knowledge. The knowledge summary factor refers to the state of scientific knowledge and 
the level of cooperation in the scientific community that influences regime formation. Four 
knowledge factors influenced the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Epistemic communities: An epistemic community is a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise in a particular domain that frames and articulates a problem and 
its solutions. Regime formation is encouraged when an epistemic community arises in 
an issue area. The epistemic community communicates with policymakers to convey 
their understanding of the issue and can often influence the form of regime options. 
An epistemic community offers consistent, authoritative and informed advice to 
reduce uncertainty in the issue area. 
Scientific convergence: A common and widely understood conception of the causes 
of a problem and suitable responses clears the way to regime formation. Scientific 
consensus on the cause-and-effect relationship of an environmental issue encourages 
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international cooperation. Some theorists argue that international cooperation occurs 
almost spontaneously with scientific convergence on an issue. 
Knowledge and information: Successful commons governance is easier when the 
dynamics of the resource are well-understood, including the stocks, flows, and 
processes within the resource system and the human-environment interactions that 
affect the resource system. Information should be verifiable, and it must be congruent 
with decision-maker's needs and the scale of the particular decision or event. 
Information must include scientific uncertainties and individual and societal values 
related to the resource. 
Model uncertainty: Model uncertainty occurs when players do not understand a 
problem in its full complexity and have incomplete information about their payoff 
relative to others. Model uncertainty can detract from regime formation because states 
can use it to disguise their true reasons for opposition to regulation (usually based on 
national interests). Model uncertainty provides a safe haven from which states can 
oppose regime formation on the grounds of 'not proven.' 
The influence of knowledge on the Law of the Atmosphere was mixed. Scientific 
knowledge on the interrelated character of the atmosphere inspired the call for a Law of the 
Atmosphere. Najam (2000, 4048) argued that "substantively, science clearly calls for a 
comprehensive policy response." However, scientific knowledge functioned to both 
strengthen and weaken the argument for a Law of the Atmosphere. The 1988 Toronto 
Conference Background Paper on the Changing Atmosphere, prepared by Jill Jaeger, stated 
that there are "strong links between the major issues of the changing atmosphere" (WMO 
1988, 393). She pointed out two links, the first between greenhouse gas emissions and 
stratospheric ozone depletion, and the second between greenhouse gas emissions and acid 
rain. Jaeger wrote, "The issues they pose are complex and involve large uncertainties ... these 
links suggest the need to consider the issues together when priorities are being set for policy" 
(WMO 1988, 394). The links between atmospheric issues were also briefly addressed by the 
three keynote speakers and in theme papers. However, these links were not fully emphasized 
in the conference because scientific knowledge on the synergies between the separate issues 
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was not well-developed. The conference, including the conference statement, tended to 
contain brief reference to links between atmospheric issues, then explore acid rain, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, and climate change individually. Scientific knowledge on 
component atmospheric issues was (more or less) ample, but knowledge of their links was 
not sufficient to buttress calls for a Law of the Atmosphere. Mostafa Tolba capitalized on this 
weakness to argue against a Law of the Atmosphere. In his address to the Ottawa Meeting, he 
said "the range of known and potential threats [to the atmosphere] differs so much spatially, 
temporally, and qualitatively that it is difficult - at this stage effectively impossible - to 
perceive their being encompassed in a single instrument" (Tolba 1989, 306). Thus, there was 
no "scientific convergence" relative to the interactions between atmospheric components. 
Related to this, model uncertainty, where players do not understand a problem in its full 
complexity, also worked against a Law of the Atmosphere. 
Knowledge factors fed into the competition between a climate change convention and 
Law of the Atmosphere. Climate change had the IPCC a strong and formalized epistemic 
community on its side. The IPCC's Working Group III enjoyed numerous endorsements for 
its work toward a climate change convention. The science supporting both climate change 
and a Law of the Atmosphere was ridden with scientific uncertainties; however, the 
knowledge base for climate change was, relatively speaking, more solid. In contrast, 
scientific evidence on interactions between atmospheric components was relatively weak. 
Context 
A seventh summary factor that impacted the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime was 
context. This summary factor refers to issues and events separate from the issue under 
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consideration that affect regime formation. Two factors are relevant to understanding the 
Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Exogenous shocks or crises: The occurrence of a shock or crises separate from the 
regime negotiating process increases the likelihood that the regime will form. 
Exogenous shocks and crises may help promote agreement on the terms of a contract. 
Crises may be manufactured by non-governmental organizations or the media. The 
media may also enhance the effects of exogenous shocks or crises on regime 
formation. 
Contextual factors: Opportunities provided by events and conditions unrelated to the 
issue under consideration may influence the likelihood of regime formation both 
positively and negatively. Large national and international events may influence 
regime formation even when they do not fall into the same policy area. Contextual 
factors can affect the timing and content of a regime in the process of formation. 
The lack of a shock or crisis helps explain why a Law of the Atmosphere was not 
perceived to be necessary. The Vienna Convention took four years of hard work and 
negotiations. It was a framework agreement, designed to be strengthened by future protocols. 
Two months after the Vienna conference, the shock provided by the famous 'ozone hole' 
paper (Farman, Gardiner, and Shanklin 1985) had a demonstrable effect on negotiations for 
the Montreal Protocol. Negotiations were completed in a remarkably short amount of time 
and achieved far more than initially thought possible (Ozone Secretariat 2000). The Law of 
the Atmosphere did not benefit from a comparable shock. 
The timing of the proposal for a Law of the Atmosphere also contributed to its 
demise. As mentioned numerous times, the idea had the misfortune to be introduced five 
years after conclusion of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, which resulted in an 
association of the umbrella Law of the Atmosphere with the long drawn out negotiations and 
yet to be ratified umbrella Law of the Sea, and the same year as the Montreal Protocol, which 
resulted in it being set in counterpoint to the efficient outcome of this single-issue agreement. 
In essence, the Law of the Atmosphere was never completely able to stand on its own merits. 
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Low influence factors 
Interest and payoff 
The interest and payoff summary factor was not influential on the Law of the 
Atmosphere nonregime. This summary factor represents a measure of the best interests and 
highest payoff of a party in relation to other parties. If regime formation is in a party's 
interest and offers an acceptable payoff, then a regime is more likely to form. Four interest 
and payoff factors help understand the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. 
Payoff structure: Game-theoretic analysis deals with strategic behaviour, where a 
player's success is dependent on the actions of other players. It assumes that there is a 
unitary actor supplied with a clear payoff matrix. With numerical values, the payoff 
matrix specifies the benefits of mutual cooperation, mutual defection, unilateral 
defection, and unrequited cooperation. Each player weighs its choices relative to the 
potential choices of others and makes a rational decision based on all available 
information. International cooperation is likely to occur when its payoff is perceived 
by players as the best and most rational choice. 
Relevant parties: Every stakeholder must participate or be represented in regime 
negotiations to help achieve success and a lasting agreement. If all stakeholders are 
not present in critical stages of negotiations, then an excluded party may refuse to 
accept or even sabotage negotiations and/or the agreement. 
Cost vs. benefits: Cooperation to govern a commons is more likely when the cost of 
collaboration is less than the cost of individual action. If a resource is perceived to be 
valuable and worth the cost of management, then resource-users are more likely to 
create an organization for its protection. The perceived benefits of organization must 
also be higher than the perceived costs of organization. The perception that there are 
high benefits of organization are most likely to arise when resource-users have full 
and accurate information about resource dynamics, the benefits and costs of various 
actions and outcomes, and the history and reliability of other resource-users. 
Issue linkage: Linking negotiations of disparate issues expands the zone of possible 
agreement. Issue linkage strengthens incentives for cooperation by linking together 
different issues, with each issue having a different payoff matrix for each player 
involved. Issue linkage is most able to promote cooperation when the states involved 
have markedly asymmetric preferences. Issue linkage works best when one set of 
players value cooperation in one issue and not in another, while another set of players 
value the opposite. Linking issues is more profitable than separate negotiations and 
can deter free-riding while making agreements more stable. 
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Here I compare the interest and payoff of a Law of the Atmosphere to that of a 
climate convention. There is a significant overlap in the payoff of both approaches. For 
simplicity, only factors with different levels of payoff will be discussed. 
The payoff for a climate convention would have been higher in terms of participation 
of relevant parties and ease of negotiations. Heavy emitters like the US and Britain were 
supporting creation of a climate convention but had little to say about a Law of the 
Atmosphere. Negotiations for a climate convention would be far less time consuming and 
complex than negotiations for an umbrella convention. 
The payoff for a Law of the Atmosphere would have been higher in terms of 
opportunities for issue linkage. States could have asymmetrical preferences on acid rain, 
stratospheric ozone, and climate change regulation, and a Law of the Atmosphere would 
have facilitated trading across these issues. However, since these links were not well 
understood by scientists at the time, it would have been hard to pursue them. 
Interest and payoff are not weighed heavily in this analysis of the Law of the 
Atmosphere nonregime because many factors incorporated into this summary factor 
encourage creation of both a climate convention and a Law of the Atmosphere. Instead, 
factors with different implications for the two regimes have been discussed. Neither a climate 
convention nor a Law of the Atmosphere was found to have a significantly better payoff in 
this limited analysis. 
Power 
A second non-influential summary factor relative to the Law of the Atmosphere 
nonregime is power. This summary factor is based in the argument that certain configurations 
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of power encourage regime formation. In this analysis, it was concluded that power had little 
influence on the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime. The Law of the Atmosphere never 
reached the negotiation phase, so power politics did not come into play. Canada was the only 
significant state actor favoring a Law of the Atmosphere, and while the US was not actively 
against a Law of the Atmosphere, it simply did not express support. The Law of the 
Atmosphere did not advance far enough to involve power as a reason for its failure to 
become a regime. 
Summary of factors inhibiting the Law of the Atmosphere nonregime, 1988-1992 
I am now in a position to answer my research question: What factors explain why a 
Law of the Atmosphere failed to become a regime during its 1988 to 1992 window of 
opportunity? 
The first and most important factor is available solutions. Two main solutions to 
atmospheric change were available to policymakers: A step-by-step approach to protection of 
the atmosphere through a single-issue climate convention, and a Law of the Atmosphere as a 
comprehensive approach for all atmospheric problems. The step-by-step approach prevailed 
primarily due to the negative perception of the Law of the Sea, and the positive perception of 
the Montreal Protocol. 
The second most important factor is the absence of leadership. The Law of the 
Atmosphere did not have any consistent or strong individual or state leaders championing its 
cause. In fact, it had Mostafa Tolba, a strong and influential leader, championing against it 
and for a climate convention. 
The third most important factor is issue characteristics. The atmosphere is a complex 
and integrated whole that was not fully understood by scientists. Pursuit of international 
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regulation of the atmosphere in its entirety under a single umbrella convention was not 
viewed as a sound use of political resources during the window of opportunity for a Law of 
the Atmosphere. 
Four factors were found to have moderate influence. 
The first is policy area. Within the policy area for international environmental issues, 
global commons issues were darkened by the recent Law of the Sea experience. Also within 
this area, but specific to atmospheric issues, were the successful Montreal Protocol and 
ongoing negotiations for further regulation of stratospheric ozone and acid rain issues. In 
light of this mood and the limited capacity in the policy area, the Law of the Atmosphere was 
not a welcome addition. 
The second is resource-user characteristics. Formation of a regime for a resource with 
users that include every human on earth is daunting prospect. However, the world has 
previously cooperated to protect its global commons with varying degrees of success. The 
perception of positive results from the step-by-step approach contributed to the formation of 
the climate regime, while the recent and negative perceptions of the Law of the Sea history 
contributed to the non-formation of the Law of the Atmosphere. 
The third is knowledge. Knowledge about the interactions between different 
atmospheric components was weak and incomplete when a Law of the Atmosphere was 
under consideration. Knowledge about the dynamics of climate change was also uncertain, 
but seemingly to a lesser degree. Support for a climate change convention was further 
boosted by a strong epistemic community, the IPCC. 
And the fourth is context. The proposal for a Law of the Atmosphere was not boosted 
by an unexpected shock on par with the famous ozone hole. No convincing research 
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suddenly surfaced to affirm the links between atmospheric components and the need for a 
Law of the Atmosphere. The Law of the Atmosphere was proposed in the same year as the 
Montreal Protocol and it fell in the gap between the conclusion of UNCLOS III and the 
treaty's entry into force. By virtue of timing, the Law of the Atmosphere was labeled and 
judged on the basis of these two treaties. 
Two factors were found not to be influential: interest and payoff, and power. The 
payoff and interests in favour of a Law of the Atmosphere were not significantly different 
than those of a climate convention. Power was not found to impact the nonregime either 
because the Law of the Atmosphere did not advance far enough to engage more than one 
state actor (Canada). There were no power politics to play because most of the world ignored 
the idea. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The results of my quest to understand the failure of a Law of the Atmosphere to form 
during its window of opportunity offers to international relations scholars theoretical insights 
and to policymakers a new perspective on the complexities and challenges faced in 
governing the atmosphere. 
Contribution of study to nonregime theory 
My research helps strengthen nonregime theory, a new area of international relations 
theory. First, it adds a global-scale case study. Second, it adds an organized methodology. If 
this methodology were to be applied consistently across a broad array of nonregime case 
studies, it may prove useful in revealing patterns that explain why certain issue areas fail to 
become governed by a regime. Dimitrov et al. (2007) suggest six nonregimes for further 
study: competition policy, information privacy, forest degradation, coral reefs management, 
tactical nuclear weapons, and small arms control. Third, my research produced at least one 
surprising theoretical result. According to regime theorists, power and interest are two of the 
most important considerations in regime formation. Relative to the Law of the Atmosphere 
nonregime, power was the lowest rated factor and interest was the second lowest. 
Incorporating commons theory and economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation allowed a more complete understanding of the Law of the Atmosphere 
nonregime beyond a simple reversal of regime theory. 
Future research efforts to expand nonregime theory could take the preliminary 
method I offer and conduct a more exhaustive search for factors in the regime, commons, 
economic theory of international environmental cooperation, and other literatures. In 
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addition, the interactions and synergies between factors could be explored. I assumed the 
factors were single units of influence, and did not explore interactions among them. One 
avenue for exploring interactions would be to use Kingdon's (1995) classic political science 
study on agenda setting and the policy process. Kingdon argues that concrete policy 
outcomes are most likely to occur when three streams (political, policy, and problem) 
converge, and that a policy entrepreneur can be instrumental in facilitating this convergence. 
Using this model, more careful attention would be paid to the relationships between actors 
and factors. 
What if? Speculations on a Law of the Atmosphere today 
Given the nonregime outcome, I initially believed that the Law of the Atmosphere 
had never been taken seriously by the international community. I held this belief almost to 
the end of my research, when I finally received a reply from Canada's Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade to a request I had made for information on the participants 
and proceedings of the 1989 Ottawa Meeting. I had expected the Ottawa Meeting to be 
stocked with only Canadians and a few Americans. The breadth of the participant list was 
totally unexpected, and revealed that the idea was not only well-known but also given serious 
consideration internationally. Despite this, states other than Canada took the same route as 
the US, which neither supported nor opposed it. Is it possible, though, that if conditions had 
been different, that we might today be living under a Law of the Atmosphere? 
How would a Law of the Atmosphere fare if it was introduced today? The 
interpretation of the relative merits of a comprehensive versus a step-by-step approach would 
likely be different. The comprehensive approach, as exemplified back then by the slow-
moving and seemingly stalled Law of the Sea, might be seen in a new light today. To date, 
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160 states have ratified the convention (Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea 
2009). Two of its biggest holdouts, Britain and Germany, ratified it in the mid-1990s, but the 
US still has not. However, the Law of the Sea is now generally considered customary 
international law. The step-by-step approach, as exemplified at the time by the success of the 
1987 Montreal Protocol, now has a less successful sister agreement in the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Kyoto Protocol commits industrialized parties to a reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. The US has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and many parties to the Protocol 
are not on track to meet their reduction targets for 2012. Thus, if introduced today, there 
might be less aversion to a comprehensive agreement and more scepticism of a single-issue 
agreement. This might enhance the chance of a Law of the Atmosphere succeeding today. 
In addition, the early either/or relationship between a climate convention and Law of 
the Atmosphere might be viewed differently. These two solutions were treated as a choice 
between one or the other, yet the inventors of the Law of the Atmosphere idea intended for 
them to be developed concurrently. When viewed from this perspective, one of the key 
arguments against a Law of the Atmosphere falls apart; namely, the argument that real action 
on climate change would be delayed by lengthy negotiations for a comprehensive 
convention. Also, from today's perspective, while the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol 
were relatively smooth and efficient, implementation of the protocol's mandate has been 
anything but smooth and efficient. Parallel work on a Law of the Atmosphere might have 
provided more opportunities for tradeoffs. For instance, developing countries are 
experiencing severe urban air pollution. Addressing this under a Law of the Atmosphere 
framework might make them more amenable to supporting developed country efforts to 
combat climate change. 
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Furthermore, from today's perspective, knowledge would play a significantly 
different role than it did 20 years ago. Knowledge on the interactions and interconnections 
between various atmospheric components is significantly stronger and more advanced. For 
example, the phenomenon of intercontinental and hemispheric transport of air pollution, 
sometimes referred to as "the globalization of air pollution," demonstrates more clearly the 
synergies between 'single' issues such as climate change, acid rain, tropospheric ozone, and 
dust in the atmosphere (Akimoto 2003; Stohl 2004; UNECE 2007). 
In conclusion, if a Law of the Atmosphere were proposed today, would it be more 
likely to form? One of the people interviewed for this study speculated on where the world 
would be if a Law of the Atmosphere had been enacted: "If we had done it then, we would be 
in a better position than we are now." Another compared the step-by-step and comprehensive 
approaches to "fast food snacks [step-by-step] versus a large well-balanced meal 
[comprehensive]." The same interviewee felt that a Law of the Atmosphere is still "a good 
idea, but probably it was just before its time, and maybe the time will eventually come when 
we start putting all these treaties and international agreements concerning atmospheric 
pollution together under an umbrella agreement. I hope so." 
A variety of factors worked against formation of a Law of the Atmosphere between 
1988 and 1992. A different configuration would apply today. Most notably, available 
solutions and knowledge would shift in influence. Factors such as leadership and context 
would be different. Finally, instead of being judged by comparison to a single-issue 
convention, a Law of the Atmosphere would more likely be judged on its own merits. Thus, I 
can not argue that formation would be a certainty, but at the very least the factors influencing 
the likelihood of success would be different. 
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Appendix 1: Interviews 
Table 5: List of interviewees 
Interviewee 
Robert Slater 
Jill Jaeger 
Howard 
Ferguson 
Edward Miles 
Nigel Bankes 
Date interviewed 
October 23, 2009 
October 23, 2009 
October 27, 2009 
November 25, 2009 
January 21, 2010 
Role in Law of the Atmosphere 1988-1992 
• Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy 
• Participated in 1989 Ottawa Meeting 
• Organized and reported results of 1987 Bellagio 
Workshop 
• Organized and reported results of 1988 Toronto 
Conference 
• Assistant Deputy Minister of AES 
• 1988 Toronto Conference Director 
• Participated in 1989 Ottawa Meeting 
• Authored draft Law of the Atmosphere 
incorporated into 1989 Ottawa Meeting Statement 
• Consultant for American government on a Law of 
the Atmosphere 
• Consultant for Canadian government on a Law of 
the Atmosphere 
• Participated in 1989 Ottawa Meeting 
Interview Questions: 
1. How were you involved in the Law of the Atmosphere? 
2. Why do you think that the Law of the Atmosphere did not become a treaty? Are any 
of these reasons more or less important than the others? 
3. Is there anything else you would like to add about the Law of the Atmosphere? 
4. Is there anyone who was involved in the Law of the Atmosphere that you think I 
should contact for my research project? 
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Appendix 2: Draft principles for a Law of the Atmosphere 
From the Statement of the Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts, February 22, 1989: 
A. The following elements should be addressed in any framework "umbrella" convention on 
protection of the atmosphere: 
/. Atmosphere 
The following two variants are proposed for the definition of atmosphere: 
"Atmosphere" means the resource constituted by the global mass of air surrounding the earth. 
"Atmosphere" means all or part of the collection of gases which lie within the limits of the 
troposphere and stratosphere as defined by the WMO international standard atmosphere. 
2. Atmospheric interference 
"Atmospheric interference" means any change in the physical or chemical condition of the 
atmosphere resulting directly or indirectly from human activities and producing effects of 
such a nature as to appreciably endanger human health, harm living resources, ecosystems 
and material property, impair amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the 
environment; 
"International atmospheric interference" means any atmospheric interference of which not 
both the origin and the effects are wholly located within the area under the national 
jurisdiction of one State. 
Note: The notion of "atmospheric interference" was found useful as a key to the obligations 
of the Convention. It should include both the elements of appreciable danger and appreciable 
harm (or any other adjective such as "significant", "substantial", etc.) depending on the 
degree of tolerance to harm [threshold] that may be adopted. When the interference affects 
the atmosphere globally, qualifying it as "international" seems unnecessary. 
3. Common resource of vital interest 
Without prejudice to the sovereignty of States over the airspace superjacent to their territory 
as recognized by international law, arid for the purposes of this Convention, the atmosphere, 
as defined, constitutes a common resource of vital interest to mankind. 
4. Obligation to protect and preserve the atmosphere 
States have the obligation to protect and preserve the atmosphere. 
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5. Sovereign right of States to permit human activities and the limits thereto 
The sovereign right of States to permit in their territories or under their jurisdiction or control 
all human activities that they consider appropriate must be compatible (must conform) with 
their obligations to protect and preserve the atmosphere. 
Note: For historical reasons and because it contains a relevant principle of international law, 
transcription of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration should be included in the 
preamble. 
6. Implementation of the Convention through protocols 
The contracting parties shall endeavour to enter into protocols for the implementation of the 
obligations of this convention with contracting parties and non-contracting parties regarding 
atmospheric interferences. 
7. Measures to prevent, reduce or control 
States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce or control any international 
atmospheric interference or significant risk thereof arising from activities under their 
jurisdiction or control. To this end they shall, in accordance with the best practicable means 
at their disposal and their capabilities, develop and implement policies and strategies and as a 
part of them control measures taking into account the nature, extent and effects of the 
atmospheric interference and the extent to which the atmospheric interference arises from 
activities under their jurisdiction or control. 
8. No transfer of damage or hazards or transformation of one type of atmospheric 
interference into another interference 
In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control international atmospheric interferences, 
States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area 
to another area or transform one type of atmospheric interference into another type of 
international atmospheric or other environmental interference. 
Note: Accepted, with the proviso that the text should convey the idea that the rule therein 
contained cannot be applied rigidly, as is recognized in the commentary of the Report by 
Professor Lammers. 
9. Additional domestic measures 
The provisions of the Convention shall in no way affect the right of the Contracting Parties to 
maintain or adopt additional domestic measures, provided that these measures are not 
incompatible with the obligations of the Contracting Parties under the Convention. 
100 
10. Bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements and arrangements 
(1) The Contracting Parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements or 
arrangements with Contracting Parties and Non-Contracting Parties regarding, atmospheric 
interferences, provided such agreements or arrangements are not incompatible with the object 
and purposes of this Convention. 
(2) The provisions of this Convention shall not affect any agreements or arrangements, 
referred to in paragraph 1 above, which the Contracting Parties have entered into prior to the 
entry into force of this Convention for them for the purpose of preventing, reducing or 
controlling atmospheric interferences, provided the provisions of such agreements or 
arrangements are not incompatible with the object and purposes of this Convention. 
11. General obligation to co-operate 
States shall co-operate, directly or through competent international organizations, to protect 
the atmosphere. 
12. Policies and Strategies 
States shall, in accordance with the means at their disposal and their capabilities, co-operate 
in the elaboration, formulation, co-ordination or harmonization of policies and strategies 
including measures to prevent, reduce or control activities under their jurisdiction or control 
causing or likely to cause atmospheric interferences. 
13. Exchange of Information 
States shall exchange scientific, technical, socio-economic, commercial and other 
information relevant for the protection of the atmosphere, and facilitate and encourage the 
exchange of such information. 
Note: The question of the treatment of confidential information will require consideration in 
the drafting of a conventional provision on this matter. 
14. Research and Systematic Observations 
(1) States shall, as appropriate, and in accordance with the means at their disposal and their 
capabilities, undertake, promote and co-operate in the conduct of systematic collection and 
transmission of data, research and scientific assessments on: 
(a) the state of the atmosphere; 
(b) activities, practices, processes and substances that may cause international 
atmospheric interferences; 
(c) alternative activities, practices, processes and substances and their socioeconomic 
and environmental implications, aimed at preventing, reducing or controlling 
international atmospheric interferences; 
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(d) the nature and extent of the effects of any modifications of the atmosphere on 
human health, living resources and ecosystems, material property, amenities and 
other legitimate uses of the environment. 
(2) States shall promote the role of appropriate world data centres in ensuring the validation 
and transmission of observational data. 
15. Development and transfer of technology 
In order to prevent, reduce and control atmospheric interferences and taking into account in 
particular the needs of developing countries, States shall co-operate in promoting the 
development and transfer of relevant technologies and the provision of technical assistance. 
16. Prior notice and environmental impact assessment of planned activities 
When a State has reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under its 
jurisdiction or control may cause an atmospheric interference outside such jurisdiction, it 
shall: 
(a) give timely notice to the competent international organization [and to the other States 
concerned]; 
(b) make an assessment of the potential effects of such activities before carrying out or 
permitting the planned activities; 
(c) on its own initiative or upon request of the competent international organization [or of the 
other States concerned], provide such relevant information as will permit the competent 
international organization [or the other States concerned] to make an assessment of the 
probable effects of the planned activities. 
Note: Texts between [] are applicable in the context of the protection of the atmosphere but 
should be deleted for the purposes of an instrument on climate protection. 
This principle would be appropriate for a subsidiary instrument, but would require further 
consideration for inclusion in a framework convention. 
17. Consultations 
(1) Consultations shall be held, upon request, -at an early stage between, on the one hand, the 
competent international organization and States concerned and, on the other hand, States 
under whose jurisdiction or control activities which require prior notice are planned. 
(2) Consultations shall also be held, upon request, once such activities are being carried out. 
18. Emergency situations 
(1) When a State becomes aware of an emergency situation or other change of circumstances 
arising from incidents or activities under its jurisdiction or control and suddenly giving rise to 
an atmospheric interference or significant risk thereof causing or likely to cause harm in ail 
area under the jurisdiction of another State or in an area beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, it shall immediately take appropriate measures, to control the cause of the 
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emergency situation and immediately notify other States affected or likely to be affected by 
such an atmospheric interference, as well as the competent international organizations. 
(2) It shall provide those States and organizations with such pertinent information as will 
enable them to minimize the harmful effects of the atmospheric interference and co-operate 
with them, in order to prevent or minimize the harmful effects of an emergency situation or 
other change of circumstances referred to in paragraph 1. 
(3) States shall develop contingency plans in order to prevent or minimize the harmful effects 
of such an emergency situation or other change of circumstances referred to in paragraph 1. 
Note: This principle would not be suitable for an instrument on climate protection. 
19. Liability, compensation or other relief 
Contracting Parties shall develop appropriate principles of liability, compensation or other 
relief under relevant protocols. 
Note: In relation to a convention on climate change, certain novel ideas concerning liability 
and compensation were considered in workshop 3 and recommended for further elaboration. 
20. Peaceful settlement of disputes 
(1) If a dispute arises concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, the 
parties to the dispute shall, at the request of anyone of them, consult among themselves as 
soon as possible with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to means of peaceful settlement 
provided for by a competent international organization, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice. 
(2) If the parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
have not agreed on a means of resolving it within 12 months of the request for consultation 
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be referred at the request of any party to the 
dispute, for settlement in accordance with the procedure determined by the operation of 
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 below. 
(3) Paragraph 2 above shall similarly apply in the event that the dispute has not been resolved 
within 18 months after the parties to the dispute agree on a means of resolving the dispute 
other than through arbitration or settlement of the dispute by the International Court of 
Justice, unless the parties otherwise agree. 
(4) Each Contracting Party, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Convention, or at any time thereafter, may declare that it accepts as compulsory one or both 
of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention: 
(a) submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice; 
(b) submission of the dispute to arbitration in accordance with Annex [X] to this 
Convention. 
(5) A declaration made under paragraph 4 above shall not affect the operation of paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3 above; 
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(6) A Contracting Party that has not made a declaration under paragraph 4 above or in respect 
of which a declaration is no longer in force, shall be deemed to have accepted submission of 
the dispute to the International Court of Justice. 
(7) If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same means for the settlement of a dispute 
referred to in paragraph 4 above, the dispute may be submitted only to that procedure, unless 
the parties otherwise agree. 
(8) If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same means for the settlement of a dispute 
referred to in paragraph 4 above, or if they have both accepted both means, the dispute may 
be submitted only to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties otherwise agree. 
(9) The provisions of this principle shall apply with respect to any protocol to this 
Convention except as otherwise provided in the protocol concerned. 
21. World Atmospheric Trust Fund 
States should consider the possibility of establishing a World Atmosphere Trust Fund. The 
beneficiaries of the Trust Fund should be developing countries. 
22. Co-ordination of existing institutional arrangements 
States should consider co-ordinating and integrating the institutional arrangements for the 
various atmosphere-related regimes, such as the Vienna Ozone Convention and the ECE 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, and their protocols. 
23. Monitoring 
States should consider whether any monitoring system established under the Convention 
might usefully serve to provide early warning and to integrate and coordinate monitoring 
systems worldwide. 
24. Participation in the convention 
The Convention and any protocol shall be opened for signature or accession by States and by 
regional economic organizations. The question of the form of participation of other 
international organizations in the Convention requires further consideration. 
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